

The Middle East in the 19th Century and Beyond: Land of Politics and Conflict

HI405

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- C. Building an Empire
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I. Dawn of Islam

A. Muhammad, the Messenger of Allah

Muhammad was born into the middle class merchant family of the Quraysh clan in Mecca. During childhood he lost both mother and father and was raised by his well-to-do but benevolent uncle, Abu Talib. As a young man, Muhammad was familiar with the trade business and rubbed shoulders with many European traders as well as Easterners from India and beyond. He was intrigued with the various religions he encountered including Christianity and Judaism. While the people of his heritage, the Arabs, embraced pagan beliefs it bothered him that they had somehow been missed despite being so close to the Jews and Christians. He was hired for his maturity and skills as business manager by a wealthy widow Khadija whom he later married. Theirs was a blissful union and Muhammad remained monogamous while Khadija lived. About 610, Muhammad began receiving revelations allegedly from the angel Gabriel.

He began to preach the message which he supposed should be well received. On the contrary, he had few followers and more enemies. His opponents feared that the young prophet's message endangered their economy which was heavily dependent upon the worship of Arabs at the Ka'ba. His message was also considered to be a threat to the political elite of his day. Was it not for the protection of his clan the Quraysh, Muhammad would certainly be executed. As it was, his following consisted of the young and dispossessed. In 619, Muhammad's world collapsed with the death of his protector Abu Talib and his beloved Khadija. His main opponent Abu Lahab ascended to top of the Quraysh tribe and Muhammad was forced to flee Mecca in 622, an event known as *hijra* (the flight). He was welcomed in Medina, the arch rival of Mecca, because they saw in Muhammad one who knew the intricacies of the Quraysh. In ten years, he consolidated his position in Medina, eventually defeated and took control of Mecca and began a campaign of expansion of Islam that was to last beyond his death in 632 A.D. It was through marriage that Muhammad hardened the nucleus of his community and softened his enemies.

B. Diversity of Islam

1. Doctrines of Islam

Islam = the surrender of man to God (Allah). It is a system of faith. **Muslim** refers to a person, literally, "one who submits to God". A Muslim is considered to be anyone who has publicly pronounced the *Shahadah* (declaration of faith) which states, "I testify that there is none worthy of worship except God and I testify that Muhammad is a Messenger of God." According to Muhammad, the **Quran** contains the principles of eternal truth from which all knowledge must be derived. The Qur'an describes many prophets and messengers as well as their respective followers as Muslim: Adam, Noah, Abraham, Jacob, Moses and Jesus and his apostles are all confirmed as being Muslim by the Qur'an. The Qur'an states that these men were Muslims because they submitted to God, preached His message and upheld His values, which included praying, charity, fasting and pilgrimage. Thus, in Surah 3:52 of the Qur'an, Jesus' disciples tell Jesus, "We believe in God; and you be our witness that we are Muslims (*wa-shahad be anna muslimūn*)."
 In Muslim belief, before the Qur'an, God had given the Torah to Moses, the Psalms to David and the Gospel to Jesus, who are all considered important Muslim prophets. The Muslim is obligated to do very little although most sincere Muslims are very devout. The Quran specifies six "pillars of Islam" of practices of faith. 1. Every Muslim must make a profession of faith (**shahada**): "There is no God except Allah; Muhammad is the Messenger of Allah." 2. Submission in prayer (**rak'ah**) five times a day, if possible; prayers must be in Arabic and must be toward Mecca. 3. Giving of alms. **Zakah** is an obligatory offering of about 2½% of one's income and **Sadaqa** was voluntary alms giving. A poll tax was levied against "people of the book". All these taxes were kept by the government in a religious endowment, the "**waqf**". 4. During the month Ramadan, fasting is performed during daylight hours from dawn to dusk. 5. Perform **Hajj** or "the pilgrimage" to the Ka'ba in Mecca at least once in lifetime, if possible. 6. **Jihad**, some (but not all) Muslims have elevated Holy War as the sixth pillar of Islam. There are numerous references in the Quran to war and the Muslim's duty to fight.

Shariah is the law of Islam derived from the Quran. It dealt largely with family matters and simple interpersonal relationships.

Islam makes no distinction between the state and the realm of believers and thus there does not appear in the history of Islam, the “doctrine of two swords” distinguishing a secular government from a religious leadership. There developed several problems. First no matter how fervently Muhammad’s followers adhered to the Quran, they needed some more direct and personal counsel for the regulation of the personal lives and that of Islamic Society. Much of this is found in the **Hadith** (or “Traditions”) of the Prophet’s life. Although no Muslim considers Muhammad anything more than a man, they consider his life exemplary and thus Hadith is an important source of moral guidance (Hadith = what would Muhammad do? or “WWMD?”). Second, perhaps the biggest dilemma in Islam is the fact that Muhammad died without a successor. Both his male children died. The first successor (**Caliph**) was chosen by the leading members of the Islamic community in Medina. It was Muhammad’s father-in-law Abu Bakr. As the oldest Muslim and a leader of the Quraysh, he was the natural choice. During his short reign of two years, the Meccans waged war on the rest of Arabia. Abu Bakr had a brilliant general Khalid ibn-Walid that subdued the tribes of the Arabian Peninsula by the time Abu Bakr was on his death bed. Abu Bakr named Umar as his successor so that there would be no struggle after his death. Umar was young, energetic and, as the St. Paul of Islam, eager to spread the faith. Khalid had already advanced into Syria when Umar became the caliph and the combination was unstoppable. Without Islam, there could not have been the cohesion between the various tribes and Umar supplied the charisma of faith that the Prophet exhibited. In the mind of every Arab Muslim from the top commander down to the lowest soldier was Allah, Muhammad, the glory of war, booty, tribute, martyrdom and paradise all in one indivisible package. Against this fought the tired and war-weary empires of Byzantium and Persia. They had fought each other so long that they sought rest and repose. Upon these unsuspecting prey fell the Muslims. The peoples of present day Syria, Palestine and Egypt were subdued and Damascus, Jerusalem and Alexandria surrendered one after the other. They became Muslims and took on the Arabic language and this they remember with pride. Not so the Persians. In June 635 at **Qadesiya**, another Arab army defeated the Persians and subsequently took Ctesiphon, the capital of the Shah of the Sasanid dynasty. They refused to speak the Arabic language and though they profess Islam, since 1500, they belong to a sect which sets them apart from the Arabs. In Iran, the Persians never forgave Umar; until recently, it was customary to burn an effigy of Umar every year. Ironically, Umar, the second caliph of Islam was assassinated by a Persian on November 23, 644. The pattern of succession was repeated: Umar, while dying from fatal wounds, appointed a committee to select the next caliph and Uthman became the third caliph. Uthman was a member of Umayyad clan of the Quraysh that had resisted the Prophet initially. When the Prophet took Mecca, he spared the Umayyad clan of any retribution. Now when one of their own became caliph, there lacked the same zeal and devotion to Islam seen in the previous caliphs. It was reported that Uthman became so corrupt that he would sell governorships for money and beautiful slave girls. His mismanagement and infidelity made him unpopular and drove the Prophet’s companions including his son-in-law Ali to plot against him. Ironically the event that drove Muslims to act against him was the canonization of the Quran. He was accused of tampering with the Quran to protect the Umayyads and in Kufa, Egypt, 500 soldiers surrounded the caliph’s house. Finally, the soldiers entered and executed the errant caliph. A week later, Ali, a man of valor and piety, was made caliph. By now the problem of succession was widely disputed. One group held that the Prophet’s successors must be from the blood line of the Quraysh tribe. Since all members of Quraysh were eligible for the caliphate, there was a good deal of rivalry among the different families. This sect became the **Sunni**. Another group, the “legitimists” believed that the caliphate was a divine office requiring divine appointment. They believed that Ali as son-in-law, cousin and adopted son was the legitimate successor and that all subsequent caliphs would be chosen from his descendents. The legitimists were known as *Shi’at Ali* (partisans of Ali) or simply, **Shi’a**. Another group, a minority of Muslims believed that the caliphate belonged to no family or tribe but rather a man of great faith and piety. These Muslims were puritans, practicing in simplicity and purity of the Quran. They were zealous

warriors who felt that Islam should be purged of Muslims who were not faithful. Although they initially sided with Ali, they later were disappointed and withdrew their support. Consequently, they were known as *Kharijites* (seceders). Ali ruled well, dismissing all the corrupt governors and officials of Uthman and inaugurated reforms which returned to the simplicity of the Prophet. The traditional Muslim story of the Battle of the Camel is one of treachery and conspiracy. The first challenge to Ali's caliphate came in 656 AD, when Muhammad's widow, Ayisha, who held a personal hatred for Ali and heard that someone murdered Uthman, knew that this was the opportunity of deposing Ali. She incited Ummayyad opposition in Mecca by alleging Ali was an accomplice to the murder of Uthman and led forces of 3,000 from Medina to Basra, Iraq. Talha and Zubayr, early converts to Islam and companions of the Prophet that they were, could break their solemn pledge so casually as they did. If they really believed that Ali was implicated in the murder of Uthman, they ought to have said so in the Prophet's Mosque in the assembly of all Muhajireen and Ansar instead of taking the oath of loyalty to him. But they did not, and they took the oath of loyalty. As long as they had hope that Ali would appoint them governors, they kept quiet. But as soon as they lost that hope, they broke their pledge, and rose in rebellion. They executed some 600 in the city thought oppose their cause and took over Basra. Ali, a seasoned warrior, was reluctant for Muslims to fight Muslims and led his forces so as to avoid excessive casualties. The rebels proceeded in full battle regalia out of Basra where they encountered the new caliph's army. "O Lord of all Creation! I seek Thy Mercy. Thou art aware of all that I feel or think or do. Nothing is hidden from Thy sight. If I have taken part, directly or indirectly, in the murder of Uthman, or if I have abetted those men who murdered Uthman, or if I was secretly happy when he was killed, show Thy displeasure to me. But if I am innocent of all guilt of complicity in the murder of Uthman, then show Thy displeasure to all those people who allege that I am an accomplice in the crime against Uthman." Ali was victorious but extended to Ayisha mercy as the Prophet's widow and allowed her to return with an escort to Medina. The Governor of Syria, Mu'awiya, a member of the Umayyads and relative of Uthman, presented evidence accusing Ali of being an accomplice to Uthman's murder. He assembled the Syrian army and confronted Ali at Siffin on the Euphrates in 657. Ali again was about to conquer them when the Syrians appealed on the Quran for arbitration. Ali, being just and honorable, accepted their request to the behest of the Kharijites (they seceded claiming "There is no arbitrator but God"). By accepting arbitration, Ali had in effect called his own legitimacy as caliph into question. Mu'awiya, on the other hand, established a claim to the caliphate and in May 660, he had himself proclaimed caliph. In the next year, Ali was wounded by a Kharijite and died two days later. This presents another dilemma of Islam in that Mu'awiya and his descendants form the Umayyad dynasty of Caliphs that interrupted the normal pattern of succession and thus are considered by some to be "usurpers". Eventually the position of caliph lost power and influence, becoming a mere figurehead. In their place, Islamic scholars and teachers (*ulema*) may participate in the leadership role. Although there is no religious hierarchy or organization, as a Muslim's obligations are directly to God and not to any church or individual, Islamic religious leaders have different titles (*shaykhs, mujtahids, mullahs, muftis*, etc). The ulema have greatly influenced political change in Islam, usually restoring the authority of laws of the Quran (shariah) and observance of traditional practices of Islam. The ulema have generally identified with the Muslim masses rather than the elite of government.

With the loss of caliphs, some theological rationalization had to be found. This is where Islam divided. The *Sunni* (true path) believe that the modern descendant of Muhammad follows the blood line of caliphs and thus must be of the Quraysh tribe. The only innate aristocracy in Islamic civilization consists of those individual leaders who can trace their family lineage to the Prophet Muhammad. Sunnis consider the Quran as infallible, and the body of law is theoretically complete and unchangeable. Despite this, as the empire of Islam expanded, the leaders discovered that the Quran did not contain all the answers to questions of law facing the modern communities. This lead Muslim authorities to ask,

“what would Muhammad have done?” They resorted to a collection of traditions, *hadith*, recorded by those who knew the prophet personally, to settle difficult decisions, moral and legal controversies and even matters of personal hygiene. There were some 600,000 hadith in circulation but these were abridged to some 7,500 considered to be of genuine authority. The Quran and hadith form the totality of the law of Allah, *Shari’a*, which form the basis of Islamic jurisprudence. Only when the Quran and hadith fail to be of any assistance do Islamic justices resort to analogies (interpreting obsolete principles in the Quran in a modern context) and consensus (agreement of the community of Islam) for resolving legal conflicts and evaluating novel ideas. Innovation and deviation are difficult, sometimes even heretical, in Sunni Islam. Because of its blood-line ties, Sunnism was the banner of the Arab people and as they conquered Mesopotamia and Egypt, the various Semite tribes of the region willingly adopted Sunnism as well as the Arabic language. On the other hand, the Persians, although converting to Islam, resented their fate in the hands of Arab conquerors and formed opposition on three fronts: religious, political and literary. They refused to adopt the Arabic language, became a source of smoldering revolts against the Arabic caliphs and adopted any branch of Islam that was not Sunni, in particular Shi’ism and Kharjite. The Persian resentment is a source of conflict within the Islamic community to this day.

This other major division of Islam, *Shi’i* (partisans of Ali), holds that the law adapts to changes in society. Shi’i reject the caliphs after Ali as being usurpers and the subsequent successors of Muhammad are the *Imam*, a spiritually appointed leader qualified to interpret the law. Ali was the first imam and subsequent imams succeed by divine appointment. The imam is not selected by the community. The imam is the vice regent of God and exists in a state of permanent grace which renders them infallible, impeccable and immaculate, a “man-God”. The third imam, Hussayn, was martyred at Karbala and Shi’ites have depicted his death as vicarious for the sins of the world. The doctrine of the Imamate forms the basis for Shi’i political theory and the legitimate government belongs to the imam. All governments not under the imam, including the Sunni caliphs, are not legitimate. Most Shi’ites believe, especially in Iran, the twelfth and last imam has gone into hiding. This **Hidden Imam** or “*Mahdi*” (Messiah) parallels the Christian belief in that in the end of time he will come again as a liberator and conqueror and establish a reign of righteousness. Shi’ites who hold this belief are sometimes called “Twelvers”. In the absence of the imam, the scholars or mujtahid fulfill this role imperfectly. Thus in Shi’i communities, the mujtahids are the major source of interpreting the law on all social, political and religious affairs and they serve the immensely significant role of controlling and channeling change in Shi’i Islamic societies. Usually there is more than one mujtahid at any one time resulting in differences of opinion. There was no hierarchical organization to appoint such leaders and thus anyone aspiring to be a mujtahid had to study Shi’i doctrine and the *Shari’a* (these scholars are called *ulama*) but not many reached the coveted position. They had to have reputation for piety, wisdom and leadership. The mujtahid would be informally chosen by consensus among the *ulama*. Sometimes the head of the government could pit one mujtahid against another in order to bring about social changes but when they were united, the result might be quite rigid and reactionary (as in the Iranian Revolution). Shi’ism incorporates mysticism, saints, intercessors, belief in atonement and a spirit of high cult, all of which are repugnant to most Sunnis. One sect of Shi’ism stop with the grandson of Husayn, Zayd, as the last real imam and reject the doctrine of the second coming as do the Sunnis. Another and perhaps more important sect is the *Ismaili* or “Seveners” who believe that Ismail, the seventh imam, was the last legitimate imam. Seveners introduce occult mysticism to Shi’ism, are obsessed with the number seven and had the greatest missionary activity of all Islam. One of their leaders founded the Fatimid caliphate of Egypt.

Another sect of Islam is *Sufism* or Islamic mysticism. Sufism is so-called because its adherents wore a garment made of wool (*suf*). They believe the world is a manifestation of God and there is a true resemblance between the attributes of God and man. Orthodoxy has placed Islam in a dark, dreary shell and Sufism has broken the shell and brought joy and openness. Sufis call themselves “people of the way” and place greater importance on the heart than the mind. From the Sufis are derived the Turkish

Molavi, whose dances to music have earned the title of “whirling dervishes”. Sufis never separated from the Islamic community, both Shi’a and Sunni. Although Sufism per se has nothing to do with politics and war, they organized orders and had their own hierarchy of leaders. Of the order **Bektashi**, the Ottoman sultans belonged and from the Sufi order of **Qizilbash** the Safavid shahs of Iran emerged.

Patrimonialism has been the dominant pattern of leadership that has characterized Middle East politics for centuries. Because this pattern of leadership is ingrained into Islamic society starting with Muhammad himself, it is important to know something of its features. One of these is **balanced conflict**. The patrimonial leader has ruled on the foundation of pervasive division and personal rivalry (divide and rule). Cleavages and tension are an integral part of the system. Parents raise their children by sharpening sibling rivalry and tension. The oft-quoted Arab proverb “I against my brother, my brother and I against my cousin, my cousin and I against the stranger” describes this well (see Genesis 16:12). Another aspect is **informality**. Patrimonial politics lack formal structure. This is characterized by the absence of parliaments and political parties, which are byproducts of Western influence. The preferred process is through informal structures such as secret societies, coffeehouse gatherings, religious assemblies at the mosque, political cliques, etc. Patrimonial leaders rule by personalism and proximity. The hierarchy of the subordinate rulers is dependent upon the closeness to the head of the government. Patrimonial leaders tend to be authoritarian and direct their commands through the face-to-face contact with their household which then in turn carries out policy by means of the bureaucracy.

European influence on Islam raised serious questions: How is it that prosperity and material comforts have come to those that reject Islam? **Muhammad Ibn Abd al-Wahhab** hypothesized that it was because of a failure on the part of Muslims to follow the Quran literally and moved to cleanse Islam of corruption in the eighteenth century. This began the Wahhabi movement on the Arabian Peninsula which continues to this day. In the nineteenth century, **Jamal al-Din al-Afghani** attempted to answer the question by reforming Islam. An extreme activist al-Afghani sought to unify all Muslims under one Islamic government over which one Supreme Caliph would bear rule. He believed that if Islamic countries could shake off foreign domination or influence, reform their governments to adapt to present-day conditions, the Muslim people would be able to work out for themselves a glorious empire independent of European nations. Al-Afghani did not hesitate to endorse extreme measures to achieve these goals, including assassination of recalcitrant rulers.

C. Transformation of an Empire

Unlike other religions, Islam was founded upon conquest and for 1,000 years, its lifeblood was war and expansion. To the Muslim, soldiers fought for the cause of Allah. Even from the very beginning, the Prophet was often depicted with sword in hand. From the battle of Badr (624) until the eleventh century, the advance of Islam was not effectively checked and Muslim Umayyads conquered all of North Africa and crossed the straits of Gibraltar and established the independent Caliphate of Andalusia with capital at Cordoba. It wasn't until 1609 when the Muslims were finally ousted by Philip III. Within the Empire of Islam, the position of caliph began to lose its significance, giving way to corruption and treachery. Just as the Umayyads had usurped the caliphate from Ali, in the eighth century, the family of Abbas (brother to Abu Talib and another of Muhammad's uncles) stirred up dissention against the Umayyads among the Persians, Shi'is, Kharijites and other malcontents. The Abbasids thus used the oppressed and downtrodden to establish themselves in power and once they got it, they turned against their abettors. This caused a further rift between Muslim Arabs and their Persian bretheren. In meantime the power of caliphate began a steady decline as was given over to corruption. Thanks to slavery and concubinage of conquered peoples, Muslim society was inevitably transformed into a composite of Arabs, Persians, Syrians, Egyptians, Berbers, Turks and Indians. The Turks, who were brave and obedient at first, were highly desirable as bodyguards for the caliph. As the caliphate weakened, the

bodyguards began to take control of the state. Their leader became the grand vazir whose power eventually superseded that of the caliph. The empire was partitioned
III.

D. Saudi Arabia

The Saud clan in Arabia owed much of its influence to being allied with a movement started by Muhammad Ibn 'Abd al-Wahhib, the founder of Wahhabism. Wahhib found an ally and protector in the head of the Saud clan, Muhammad Ibn Saud Ibn Muqrin. When Wahhib died, the Saudi leaders carried the torch as both the spiritual and political heads of Wahhabism. Their objective was to stem the tide of foreign domination and influence and to restore the traditional rule of Islam. Ibn Saud faced some intense rivalries from within the family, such as his three uncles Muhammad, Abdullah and Saud; with rival clans such as the Rashid clan who controlled Riyadh; and outsiders such as the Turks who controlled the western region known as Hasa and the Hashemites who controlled the Hijaz along the Red Sea. The Saud family, like other clans on the Arabian Peninsula, had been torn by internal strife for more than a century with endless treachery and feuding. This constant tension and conflict represents a general pattern. The Rashid clan was ultimately vanquished by Ibn Saud in 1906. By 1934, he consolidated Najd, Hasa, Hijaz and 'Asir into the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. In so doing, he healed rifts within his own family, forced rival clans into submission, taken Hasa from the Turks and conquered Mecca and Hijaz. One of the major reasons for his success was that Ibn Saud formed the *Ikhwan* (Brotherhood) movement in which he recruited warlike Bedouins into service for Allah and used them to settle the land they conquered. The religious ideology of *Ikhwan* was a puritan zeal that helped bind the society fragmented by rivalries together. The *Ikhwan* served as the rallying cause that drove Ibn Saud's forces from one military victory after another. Ibn Saud had a strong belief that he was fighting for a spiritual cause and that he was being directed by the will of Allah. After 1934, Ibn Saud spent the next almost twenty years developing an elaborate patrimonial government. The discovery of oil at Jebel Dhahran in 1938 propelled the government to be one of the richest in the world. When Ibn Saud died in 1953, his annual income was close to \$275 million. Even today, Saudi Arabia represents one of the world's greatest patriarchies. It is operated as a giant personal household. In a system of patrimonial rule, the leader relies very strongly on constant face-to-face contact as a means to control personalities. At the heart of the government is the family of the ruler. Ibn Saud had an estimated 300 wives and the countless princes are the his ministers. It is estimated there is one prince for every 5,000 people in Saudi Arabia. There is purpose in marrying many wives. Ibn Saud often married the widows and adopted the orphan children of important allies and rivals killed in battle in order to seal lasting friendly relationships with their families. Through the years, he married into all the leading families in Arabia including the Wahhabis, the Rashids, and many others. The Patrimonial leader represents a father figure who always encourages his children to come to him with their troubles. Ibn Saud was famous for his devotion to hearing the compliments and complaints of all his subjects who came to him regardless of their social status or position in life. When the visitor departed, they always received a gift from the patriarch and left as well with a deeper loyalty to their benevolent king. Under his guidance, Saudi Arabia achieved order and tranquility rather than internal strife and foreign domination. On the downside, with a patrimonial system, sudden and great wealth seldom lead to reform and modernization. These resources become clogged in the pockets of the patrimonial family. The result is Rolls Royces and 25-million dollar palaces alongside abject poverty and illiteracy. The discovery of oil transformed the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia and enabled it to persist into the modern era. The kingdom's first oil concession was granted by Ibn Saud to Sa

IV. Twentieth Century Middle East.

The modern Middle East is a complex tapestry of different ethnic groups, cultures, religions and political ideologies. Individual nations have diversities within and without that are sources of conflict and tension that keeps the whole tangled network in constant state of flux. Some societies are

extremely splintered such as Lebanon, Syria, Iraq and Iran whereas others have fewer social divisions but the differences between them run violently deep such as the Sudan, Israel and Pakistan. The conflicts may be ethnic: Iraqi Kurd vs Iraqi Arab; political: Egyptian Marxist vs Egyptian Muslim Brotherhood Party; religious: Egyptian Copt vs Egyptian Muslim; national: Iraqi vs Iranian; religious sects: Iraqi Sunni vs Iraqi Sh'i. These are but a few of the thousands of people groups that exist in tension with one another.

C. Collapse of Ottoman Empire

Left a power vacuum. main players were Britain, France and Islamic movements. Russia out because of Revolution and Germany lost WWI. Mixture of cooperation and collusion as well as rivalry and competition.

British objectives: 1. security of path to India, including Suez canal 2. security of oil resources with free access to Persian Gulf 3. What to do with the territories partitioned from the former Ottoman Empire
French objectives less clear: competition with Britain for regional influence, protection of Catholic Christians in region. France carried 60% of Ottoman loans (they financed Suez Canal = "Canal Maritime de Suez") (Britain 14% Germany 21%) and her investors were deeply concerned about protecting their investments. Cooperated w/ British regarding canal "Entente Cordial" France would exchange Egypt for Morocco with Britain. Sykes-Picot Agreement divided Ottoman: Mesopotamia (Iraq), Arabia, Palestine would be British protectorates, Syrian and Lebanese are French protectorates. Islamic figures include Kemal Ataturk (Turkey), Reza Pahlavi (Iran), Muhammad V (Morocco), Habib Bourguiba (Tunisia) Hashemite and Ibn Saud Clans (Arabia) Sharif Hussein (Mecca) and the Arab Revolt.

Documents: Sykes Picot (1916)

1. Arab Revolt

In World War I, in order to recruit Syrian Arabs to turn against their Ottoman masters, the British contracted with them with the promise to provide them lands from the spoils of war. This uprising of Arabs stemming from Hijaz was led by Sharif Hussein in Mecca under direction of British high commissioner Sir Henry McMahon against the Ottoman empire starting in June 1916. The desert war lasted two years assisted by British advisor Colonel T E Lawrence (Lawrence of Arabia). The Hussein-McMahon Correspondence (promised Arab territories?) established relations between British and Jordan, Iraq and Arabia. While British sought to protect India and Egypt (Suez), Hussein sought to establish an Arab state. The Correspondence is subject of great controversy: territorial promises to aspiring rebels. In September 1918, as British forces invaded Damascus, Faisal (Hussein's son) declared himself ruler of Syria. Unfortunately, Arab independence was never realized.

2. Sykes-Picot Agreement finalized by Britain and France by October 1916, divided the Ottoman Empire into spheres of influence. The Br and Fr were "to recognize and protect an Arab State or a Confederation of Arab States...under the suzerainty [leadership but not to the degree of sovereignty] of an Arab Chief." Syria, southwestern Turkey, Lebanon and northern Iraq were under France and Britain was to gain Iraq, Arabia, and Transjordan. Palestine (including Jerusalem) was to be under international regime. Sykes-Picot was revised to exclude Russia and Italy. Having been awarded Syria, French troops marched on Damascus on July 25, 1920 after defeating Faisal's army. But the British took Faisal and made him king in Iraq in 1921 to quell insurrection there. Faisal's brother Abdullah was persuaded by colonial secretary Winston Churchill to accept temporary control of Transjordan. Temporary became lasting as Transjordan became Jordan in 1946. Thus Hashemite family (father Hussein and two sons Faisal & Abdullah) reigned over the largest Arab country but it wouldn't last. In 1924, Hussein was deposed by Ibn Saud in 1924. Faisal was defeated by military coup in 1958.

3. Balfour Declaration

Issued November 2, 1917, British Foreign Secretary Arthur James Balfour wrote to leading Zionist, Lord Rothschild that the British government favored the establishment of a "National Home for the Jewish People" and would endeavor to establish it without "prejudic[ing] the civil and religious rights of existing

non-Jewish communities in Palestine". It is unclear why the British were motivated to issue the Balfour Declaration. Speculation has it that they wished to please American Jewry in order to secure America's entrance into WWI or similarly for the Russian Jews to influence Russia to return to the war (which it never did because of the Bolshevik revolution). Other considerations include the facts that Zionist Chaim Weizmann was close friend of Prime Minister Lloyd George and Sir Mark Sykes was a strong believer in Zionism.

The end of World War I brought into collision conflicting promises along with Britain's unquenchable imperialism. To add further tension, high-minded Wilsonian idealism emanating from the US seemed to encourage resistance against the European "mandates". The actual boundaries were determined during the Conference of San Remo in April 1920 and subsequently adopted by the League of Nations, in which the US refused to participate. These boundaries continue largely unchanged to the present day. As a result, the nations of Syria, Transjordan, Iraq, Lebanon, Palestine, Turkey were formed which heretofore never existed. The negotiators who formed the boundaries were not concerned or constrained by the wishes aspirations of the peoples who lived there but rather their own diplomatic maneuvers and agendas. The mandates were formed by League of Nations as "temporary" administrations by the British and French (and not to be mere colonies) until these future nations were ready for independence: "their existence as independent nations can be provisionally subject to the rendering of administrative advice and assistance by a mandatory unit until such time as they are able to stand alone." Following the completion of the Suez canal in 1869, the British had maintained control over Egypt from 1882 through WWI but serious anti-British riots in 1919 made overt control Egyptian affairs extremely costly. The British unilaterally declared Egypt independent in 1921 but remained the economic masters there for another 30 years.

D. Between Wars Turbulence in Middle East

1. Turkish Nationalism. After the collapse of the Ottoman Empire, a distinguished army officer Mustafa Kemal Ataturk was determined to establish a new, decidedly Turkish identity, building on the ideas of nationalism and popular sovereignty once expressed by the Young Turks and Committee for Union and Progress (CUP) which brought the Ottomans into alignment with Germany, Austria Hungary during WWI. Proceeding slowly, Ataturk first abolished the Sultanate in 1922, ending the long-standing rule of the Ottomans. As a political maneuver, he allowed one of the Ottoman princes to remain as Caliph, thus temporarily appeasing the religious sensibilities of his associates and the masses. After securing his power, in 1924, he abolished the caliphate as well. As Armenians were forcibly removed to Russian Armenia back in 1915 and the Arabs went about to establish Arabia in Hijaz, Ataturk saw his opportunity to establish a distinctive Turkish nation. Still the challenges of Kurds within the borders to the southeast and a significant Greek population remaining in the country compelled Ataturk to embark in a massive population resettlement between 1923 and 1930. About 1.5 million Greeks were sent from Turkey to Greece and a smaller number of Turks moved from Greece to Turkey. Reinforcing the ideas of Turkish nationalism, Ataturk's political party, the Republican People's Party (RPP), assumed power over the government in 1931 and adopted six pillars of "Kemalism": populism, nationalism, statism, republicanism, secularism and reformism/revolutionism. In order to carry out reforms and secure Turkey's independence from foreign powers, the RPP was decidedly militaristic. Long after Kemal's death in 1938, repeatedly in 1960, 1971, 1980 and 1997, the Turkish military assumed the role of the savior of the republic and protector of Kemal's legacy. The republican state Kemal created allowed for no dissent but ruthlessly deposed rebellion and opposition. Engineering social change was one of Kemal's highest priorities. He saw Turkey needed to be European and secular. He dismantled Islamic law (Sharia) and replaced it with Swiss Civil Code. He introduced a Latinized alphabet in place of the Arabic one for the written Turkish. He instituted women's rights, embarked in major industrialization, introduced Western dress. His reform was visionary and extensive, but not without opposition. He

succeeded because of his charismatic appeal to Turkish national pride. Today, Turkey remains largely unchanged except for the allowance of more than one political party.

2. The Shah of Iran

In the 1920s, Iran clung to an independence of sorts. It could not assert complete sovereignty over its territory without British support. A distinguished soldier, Reza Khan rose quickly through the ranks of the Cossack Brigade which was administered by Russia. After World War I, Reza saw the dismantling of Iran into spheres of influence of the western powers and the incompetence of the fractious Majles and the bumbling Qajar shah who was interested only in worldly pleasures. In February 1921, Reza Khan and co-conspirator Seyyed Zia-aldin Tabatabai staged a military coup. Seyyed Zia assumed role as Prime Minister and Reza was the military commander-in-chief. Initially the coup did not have the power to assume complete control and the Majles and to lesser extent the Qajar king managed to influence the course of events. Reza continued to work establishing domestic order and tranquility and so doing became a popular figure among the military, the masses and even many politicians. Finally on December 12, 1925, the Majles voted to abolish the Qajar dynasty and established Reza Shah as the new monarch. Reza Shah and Kemal Ataturk were personal friends and Reza drew inspiration from Ataturk's establishment of a republic. Just as Ataturk had systematically destroyed Islam's influence in Turkey making it a secular society, Iranian *Shi'ite* clerics (*ulama*) feared a similar fate in Iran. Reza Shah, however, recognized the power of the *ulama* and decided against active antagonism of religion. The impotent Qajar dynasty had only nominal control over Iran's vast territories. Since the early 1900's, Russia and Britain had divided Iran into spheres of influence and Russian agents and their Iranian proxies operated with complete immunity to the north and similarly, the British to the south. Powerful tribal confederacies, the Bakhtiaris in central Iran and the Lurs in the northwest, defied government control. Iran was ethnically more divided and industrially less developed than Turkey, plus the *ulama* was more powerful and conservative. Consequently, Reza Shah nationalist aspirations differed from those of Ataturk. He attempted to make the Pahlavi dynasty national in scope and nature, bring about economic and infrastructural development and institute social changes to make Iran "modern". He neutralized the tribal powers with the military forming temporary alliances, pitting one against another and deftly sowing dissent among them. Gradually, he disarmed their warriors, stripped their chiefs of power, conscripted their youths into his army and forced the remainder to settle in villages. He organized rural populations into agricultural centers, strengthened the infrastructure by building 13,000 km of roads and the Trans-Iranian Railway at the cost of \$155 million, industrialized the cities by forming state-owned textile and oil industries. Tehran University was established in 1934 and the Ministry of Education was expanded. Judicial reforms replaced *Sharia* with a secular civil code. On the downside, the army tripled in size from 40,000 in 1926 to 127,000 in 1941, the bureaucracy mushroomed and the heavy taxes and low wages prompted strikes which were brutally repressed. The Shah amassed great personal wealth. As war clouds loomed on the horizon, Iran looked increasingly to Germany for technical support. Germany gladly flooded Iran with advisors and engineering experts to undermine British and Russian influence there. In 1941 despite repeated assertions of Iran's neutrality, Soviet and British forces invaded Iran. Resistance was futile and Reza Shah abdicated in favor of his 22 year old son Muhammad Reza Shah. Although by the time his reign ended in 1941, Reza Shah made considerable progress in the building of Iran, his son would carry the Pahlavi dynasty to the apex of political and military power.

3. Saudi Arabia

The Sherif Hasein, having curried the favor of the British by leading Arab revolt against the Ottomans in WW I established the fleeting Kingdom of Hijaz. Arabia historically swayed under the authority of rival clans including the Saud and Al Rashid clans. Ibn Saud managed to conquer most of the Najd region by the early 1920s and his aspirations for the Hijaz became reality as British enthusiasm for the Hashemite Kingdom began wavering. He began a campaign taking Ta'if in 1924 and within a few months, Mecca was under Ibn Saud's control. Subsequently Medina and Jeddah fell and by 1926, Ibn Saud declared

himself king of Hijaz and sultan of Najd. On September 27, 1932, the Arabian peninsula was recognized officially as the Kingdom of Saudi Arabia. At this point Saudi Arabia was far more embryonic than Turkey and Iran but a series of landmark events would help to change that. Ibn Saud set up a paternalistic government as a benevolent “father” of his people. The government was flooded with members of Saud clan as Ibn Saud followed the Arabic tradition of marrying many wives to cement relations with rival tribes. In May 1933, the Saudi government signed a historic oil concession with Standard Oil of California forming the Arabian American Oil Company (ARAMCO). Oil was discovered in Dhahran in 1935, and by 1938 commercial exploitation was underway. By 1939, the once impoverished Saudi Arabia was receiving annual royalties of \$500,000 in gold. Soon Japanese, British, Italian and German oil companies fell over themselves vying each other for a piece of the action. Throughout the 40s and 50s, ARAMCO influence in the kingdom began to grow to the extent that the US State Department became concerned that it was meddling with the Saudi monarch and his ministers. Dhahran contained two townships that housed 5,000 American workers and resembled Bakersfield. Partial in their dealings with Arab workers, American foremen were harsh and unrelenting. Corruption and vice began to accompany the vastly increased wealth and with the great disparity of wealth and poverty in the kingdom, there was growing unrest. The royal family eventually deposed Ibn Saud in November 1964 and established his brother, Faisal, as king. A concerted effort was made to institutionalize the government, put its financial house in order and introduce procedural formality into the affairs of state. Saudi Arabia differs from all the other Islamic nations in that the Saud family’s culture permeates the life of the country politically, economically and socially.

V. Post World War II and the Age of Nationalism

World War II saw extensive involvement of European powers in conflict which put a hold on nationalistic and imperialistic developments. German and Italian forces invaded North Africa threatening the British mandates and perhaps more importantly from British perspective, the strategic Suez. Allied forces staged the first invasions of Axis-held territories in North Africa and defeated Rommel’s Afrika Korps at El Alamein in May 1943. After the dust of World War II settled the world was plunged into a new global conflict. Perhaps the three catalysts that precipitated new violence in the Middle East was the Cold War, Zionism and Islamic Nationalism. Nationalism is the political ideology that involves a strong identification of a group of individuals with a political entity defined in national terms, a national identity based on ethnic, cultural, religious or ideological commonality.

A. Zionism

A form of Jewish nationalism, Zionism was predicated on three principles: first, the constitution of Jews world wide as a people that maintained distinct identity despite centuries of global dispersion, a nation now ready to reunify; second, the location of a national homeland on a specific territory, defined on the basis of the Biblical **Eretz Israel**; third, the territorial and juridical (relating to judicial proceedings and the administration of the law) independence of this nation in the form of a modern country. Since its inception by leaders such as Chaim Weismann, Theodor Herzl, David Ben-Gurion and Hertzog the nation’s precise nature and character were deliberately articulated, including a national language of Hebrew and location in Palestine. Zionism began in 1896, Herzl published a pamphlet, *The Jewish State*, which derided the futility of assimilation of Jews into their host nations, deplored the pervasiveness of European anti-Semitism, and called for the establishment of a separate Jewish state based on Jewish identity and self-determination. In August 1897, he organized the First Zionist Congress in Basel, Switzerland, which some 200 delegates attended. By the time the Second Zionist Conference was held in 1898, local Zionist groups had expanded to over 900. Zionism was product of an intellectual milieu from

nineteenth-century Europe which perceived that 1. industrially advanced and civilized society was assumed to have the right to dominate and colonize undeveloped lands and that 2. Palestine was devoid of a people with national identity or rights. Herzl offered Sultan Abdul Hamid II of the Ottoman Empire a Jewish financial syndicate would assume all the foreign debts of the empire in exchange for a charter for a Jewish colony in Palestine but the sultan flatly refused. In the late 1800s, the Jewish population in Palestine was a tiny minority, numbering 5,000 among a total population that consisted of 300,000 Arabs, mostly Sunni Muslims, 30,000 Christians and several thousand Druze. Zionism initiated several large scale immigrations (*aliya*) into Palestine, the first from 1881-1900 involved 25,000, mostly young Zionists who were to establish self-sufficient farming communities called *Kibbutz* and would eventually end in failure. These idealists were inexperienced with farming, unfamiliar with the land and many returned to their countries of origin or emigrated to the United States. Herzl died in 1904 and his successor Dr. Chaim Weizmann turned to the British for support. Without remain distinct from neighboring non-Jewish communities. The growing Jewish community in Palestine was called Yishuv before 1948. From 1904-1928, during three successive *aliyim* the Jews "trickled" into Palestine the Arab population dwindled and the Jews flourished. During the last *aliya* 1932-1939, the floodgates opened as rising fascism and Jewish persecution resulted in massive emigrations from Europe. The large influx of Jews precipitated an economic crisis and widespread unemployment among both Jews and Arabs, however the Zionists received funding from Jews abroad and were supported by organized groups such as the Jewish Federation of Labor (*Histadrut*). Gradually the industrial base in Palestine was 90% Jewish-owned. By 1944, the Jews owned some 2,000 industries employing some 45,000 workers including the Palestine Electro Corporation harnessing the Jordan and Yarmuk rivers, and the Palestine Potash Company on the Dead Sea. Although the British appointed a prominent British Jew as high commissioner of the Palestine Mandate, Sir Herbert Samuel leaned over backwards to be just and fair to the Arab population. He appointed Haj Amin al-Husayni as Mufti of Jerusalem. Great Britain tried in vain to carry out two diametrically opposed goals of the mandate: establishing a national home for the Jews and safeguarding the civil and religious rights of the Arabs and other non-Jews. The first anti-Zionist uprising broke out in Jerusalem in 1921. Sir Herbert appointed Palestine Arab Executive Committee to act as spokesman for Arab concerns. This simmered things for eight years. In 1940, Palestine had 1.1 million Arabs and 445,000 Jews some 30% of the entire population. From 1933 to 1936 the Arab uprisings resumed, most of them directed against the British mandate. In 1936, the Mufti of Jerusalem called for a general strike. Bombing sabotage, destruction of Jewish property and widespread violence accompanied the strike. In reaction to escalating Arab violence, the Jews organized a defense corps called *Haganah* to protect Jewish settlements. Another para-military group called the Irgun was formed to carry out clandestine operations of the more nationalistic Revisionist Party which vehemently opposed the continuance of the British mandate. A third, more radical para-military organization, the *Stern Group* or "Fighters for the Freedom of Israel", engaged mostly in terrorist activities. The "Arab Revolt" only heightened Zionist extremism and terrorist attacks on British as well as Arab targets. As the situation deteriorated, the British mandate established the Peel Commission to determine potential resolution. The Peel Commission concluded that Britain could not "both concede the Arab claim to self-government and secure the establishment of the Jewish National Home." It recommended the mandate be partitioned into separate Arab and Jewish sectors. A virtual civil war broke out in Palestine. On February 7, 1939, the British convened a round table conference of Arabs and Zionists where for the first time, non-Palestinian Arab leaders from Egypt, Iraq, Saudi Arabia and Transjordan as well as non-Zionist Jews from the United States, Europe to discuss the situation in Palestine. The conference failed to even get the delegates to sit together around one table. On May 17, 1939 the British issued the White Paper. There was a reversal in favor of the Arabs. It proposed creation of two independent states of Palestine in 10 years. It limited the immigration of Jews to 75,000 over the course of the next 5 years after which further immigration would be limited to the consent of the Arabs. Land sale was forbidden in most of

Palestine and regulated in the remaining areas. Both sides rejected the White Paper but the Jews were much more vehement. There would be a “reprieve” in Palestine as World War II began and for the Jews there was no question which side they would support. David Ben-Gurion spoke “We shall fight the White Paper as if there was no war; and we shall fight the war as if there was no White Paper”.

By the end of World War II, Britain was done, resources and resolve exhausted by a war that they came uncomfortably close to losing. They desperately searched for a way to end the mandatory rule over Palestine and go on with something else. Jewish *Irgun* and *Stern Group* stepped up the pressure with unrestrained violence and terrorism as early as 1944. They bombed British police stations, oil refineries, bridges and killed civil and military officials. In November of that year, the *Stern Group* assassinated British Minister of State Lord Moyne in Cairo. The most notorious event was the bombing of British military headquarters in the King David Hotel in Jerusalem, killing over 90 people. Britain decided to turn over the mandate to the United Nations, which on November 29, 1947, adopted UN Resolution 181. The resolution, known as the UN Partition Plan, called for the partitioning of Palestine into a separate Arab and a Jewish state with Bethlehem and Jerusalem retaining international status. The plan awarded 55% of historic Palestine to the Jews, most of it fertile. The area under Jewish control included some 45% of the Arab population. Much of the 45% of the land allotted to the Arabs was not fit for agriculture. The Zionists quickly accepted the UN Partition Plan but it was rejected by the outraged Arabs. Immediately after the UN vote, Palestine erupted into civil war. For the next six months, Palestine was systematically dismantled and a new country was formed in its place: the state of Israel. Brutality reigned with atrocities committed by both sides. While Palestinian militias totaled about 7,000 combatants, the Haganah, Irgun and Stern Group swelled to 60,000, many of whom (about 20,000) had combat experience in World War II (which the Arabs had chosen to avoid). The most shocking event occurred on April 29, 1948 and was the massacre of Deir Yassin, a Palestinian village in which over 200 Arab men, women and children were butchered and dumped into wells by Irgun/Stern Group guerillas. The Arabs retaliated by ambushing a Jewish medical convoy, killing nearly 80 doctors, nurses and medical students. Panic ensued through the protracted fighting but the Haganah prohibited Jewish civilians from fleeing. On the contrary, as many as 850,000 Palestinians fled becoming refugees in the West Bank (360,000), Gaza (200,000), Jordan (100,000), Syria (82,000) and Lebanon (104,000). These events practically removed all non-Jews from Palestine and are considered by many Arabs as deliberate ethnic cleansing.

B. Israel is Born

The fact that a country was born of a people that lived through the barbarity of the Holocaust was truly a momentous occasion. But the event was to be a baptism of fire. While UN delegates were debating the details of the UN Partition Plan, on May 14, 1948, David Ben-Gurion and members of the National Council of the Jewish State proclaimed the birth of the State of Israel. President Truman immediately announced US recognition of the new state. In less than twelve hours, on May 15, 1948, the armies of six neighboring Arab nations (Egypt, Iraq, Jordan, Lebanon, Syria and Saudi Arabia) poured into Israel, at total of not more than 70,000 troops, many of whom lacked adequate training and were poorly equipped. Without unified command or clear objectives, the Arabs made credible headway at first, seizing Negev, Old Jerusalem, and advancing to within 15 miles of Haifa. The Israelis, on the other hand, were better trained and fighting for survival and began to rally. On June 11, 1948, the UN arranged a truce and declared a cease fire. An arms embargo was established and both sides were to hold their positions and refrain from reinforcing or re-arming troops. Neither side was compliant. While the Jews smuggled B-17s from the US, Beaufighters from Britain and firearms from Czechoslovakia into Israel, the Arabs had more difficulty circumventing the arms embargo. UN appointed Count Folke Bernadotte of Sweden to mediate a truce by proposing an armistice based on economic union of Arab Palestine and Jordan and an autonomous Jewish state. Both sides rejected the plan and the fighting resumed on July 9, 1948. In ten days, the Israelis made considerable gains when a second truce was imposed by the UN.

The cease fire violently ended on September 17, 1948 when Count Bernadotte was assassinated by a Sternist's bullet. Israeli forces attacked Negev and Galilee and by October 31 had achieved air superiority and succeeded in pushing Arab forces from these regions. Finally in the first half of 1949, Ralph Bunche of UN Secretariat arranged an armistice between Israel and each of the Arab nations one at a time. For his truly remarkable efforts, Ralph Bunche was awarded the Nobel Peace Prize. Too bad it was not to last. The armistice was fatally flawed. The UN did not insist that Israel return to the original partition lines of Resolution 181 and thus failed to define the political and territorial boundaries of the new states in Palestine. At that time Jordan controlled the West Bank (of the Jordan River) and the Arab sections of Jerusalem and Egypt occupied the Gaza Strip. That was all of the entire former British mandate of Palestine that remained in Arab hands. This gave Israel 20% more of Palestine than was specified in the original UN Partition Plan (55% + 20% = 75%). Despite UN insistence that Jerusalem be demilitarized and under international control, in 1949, Israel declared Jerusalem to be their capital and actually moved the legislative body, *Knesset*, and many of the government ministries there. Thus while the Jordanians controlled the Old City and Bethlehem along with many of the holy shrines of Islam, Christianity and Judaism, the Israelis occupied the larger New Jerusalem, dividing the city.

The State of Israel

The establishment of a nation of Jews marks a pivotal event in history as such a place has not existed for almost 2000 years. Israel is unique in that it is a refuge for Jews and no one else. Non-Jews have never been denied admission but will not receive the same privileges as Jews. Any Jew from anywhere in the world can fill out papers and gain citizenship, get help with finding a job and receive housing. While the same is not available to non-Jews, what distinguishes them is not crystal clear. A Jew is not one because of their religion, for although some are orthodox and follow the Torah, some have a nominal faith and still others are agnostics or atheists. What Israeli courts have consistently upheld is that a Jew is defined by birth: anyone whose mother was of Jewish blood can be considered a Jew. Immigrants into Israel who cannot prove their Jewish decent are considered non-Jews and are therefore excluded from the privileges and perquisites of Israeli citizenship. This was problematic for some refugee survivors from Germany or the Soviet Union. Other than the exclusion of non-Jews, the State of Israel is one of the most egalitarian regarding social status. The government is based on democratic principles with a parliament patterned after that in England called the *Knesset*. The Knesset is the legislative branch of the government responsible for Some 21 parties, ranging from the left wing, Marxist *Mapam* Party to the right wing *Herut* Party composed of former Irgun commandos, vie for seats within the *Knesset*. Other parties include the conservative *Likud* ("Consolidation") which is an alliance of several parties and the liberal *Mapai* or Israeli Workers' Party which are some of the largest and most influential. Israeli citizens vote for a party and not an individual candidate. Only those parties receiving sufficient votes ($\geq 5\%$) could occupy at least one seat in the *Knesset*. Because no party has ever gained enough seats to have a majority, parties often form a coalition in order to run the government. Religious parties, including the *Mizrachi* Party and the *Mizrachi* Workers' Party, believe that Zionism is rooted in Judaism and therefore religion is inseparable from Israeli nationalism. Although these parties rarely have many seats or challenge the economic positions of other parties, they are highly influential advocates of religious education and practices. They have taken part in virtually every coalition, keeping them on track for maintaining Jewish dietary and Sabbatical laws, control of marriage and divorce, bans on pig raising, etc. A Parliament Member supported by a majority in parliament becomes the Prime Minister, usually the chairman of the largest party. The executive branch is headed by the Prime Minister who appoints several deputy ministers forming the cabinet. The cabinet ministers must be approved by the Knesset. David Ben-Gurion, leader of Mapai and head of the Jewish Agency became Israel's first Prime Minister. Ben-Gurion was an ardent Zionist who became the head of the Jewish Agency before 1948. He became the *de facto* leader of the Jewish community in Palestine, and largely led the struggle for an

independent Jewish state in Palestine. In 1948, he formally proclaimed the establishment of the State of Israel, and was the first to sign the Israeli Declaration of Independence. Ben-Gurion led the provisional government of Israel during the 1948 Arab-Israeli War, and united the various Jewish militias into the Israel Defense Forces (IDF). As Prime Minister, he helped build the state institutions, presiding over various national projects aimed at the development of the country. He also oversaw the absorption of vast numbers of Jews from all over the world. Ben-Gurion retained his role until late 1953, when he resigned in order to settle in the Kibbutz of Sde Boker. He was replaced by Moshe Sharett. However, Ben-Gurion returned in a little under two years to reclaim his position. He resigned for a second time in 1963, breaking away from Mapai to form Rafi. Levi Eshkol took over as head of Mapai and prime minister. Usually the head of the largest party is asked to form the government, but on at least two occasions, other members have been asked; after David Ben-Gurion failed to get Knesset approval for a minority government in 1950, Chaim Weizmann asked Progressive Party leader Pinchas Rosen to do so (ultimately Ben-Gurion managed to form one instead). Following the 2009 elections, Shimon Peres asked Likud leader Benjamin Netanyahu to form a government, despite Likud coming second to Kadima in the elections. There is also a president, the head of the State of Israel and elected by an absolute majority in the Knesset. The position is largely an apolitical ceremonial figurehead role, with the real executive power lying in the hands of the Prime Minister. To ensure the apolitical nature of the role, the president may "neither intervene politically nor express personal views on issues that divide the public".

C. Palestinian Nationalism

Nationalism is complex. What draws people together to form a nation can be a common heritage, religion, ethnicity, ideology or land. In 1948 the Palestinian Arabs ceased to have any significant geographic identity but this did not diminish Palestinian nationalism. Before World War I nationalism in the area was identified with the Ottoman Empire or "Ottomanism". With the demise of the Ottoman Empire in 1918, nationalistic focus shifted to more localized forms: Egyptian, Iraqi, Syrian, Jordanian, Palestinian, etc. Under the British mandate, Palestinian nationalism was initially expressed with peaceful resistance, then in 1928 radicalization as Arabs faced increasing competition from Jewish settlers. From 1936-1939 there was the Arab Revolt with increasing violence, followed by a lull during World War II. In 1944 through 1948 resistance continued growing into all out civil war. After 1948, Palestinians entered a "lost" phase characterized by shock and silence until 1952 when Gamal Abdul Nasser gave them some sense of identity. It was during this time Palestinian nationalism lost its geographic focus and became absorbed into a more powerful and encompassing Arab nationalism known as Pan-Arabism whose rallying cry was for the liberation of Palestine. In 1967, with the formation of the Palestinian Liberation Organization (PLO), there began to be some organization and self-assertion. Until 1982, the PLO exhibited militarism and diplomacy under the leadership of Yasser Arafat with their headquarters in Lebanon. Beginning 1982, the Israelis began a military campaign in Lebanon intent to destroy the PLO. Following Israeli invasion of Beirut, 8,000 PLO fighters dispersed as PLO fled to Tunisia. In 1985, Israeli F-15s bombed the PLO headquarters in Tunisia. Subsequently, the PLO declined in effectiveness and gave way in 1987 to local, indigenous uprisings known as *Intifada*. In 1987, the First Intifada broke out in the West Bank and Gaza Strip. The Intifada caught the PLO by surprise, and the leadership abroad could only indirectly influence the events. A new local leadership emerged, the Unified National Leadership of the Uprising (UNLU), comprising many leading Palestinian factions. After King Hussein of Jordan proclaimed the administrative and legal separation of the West Bank from Jordan in 1988, the Palestine National Council adopted the Palestinian Declaration of Independence in Algiers, proclaiming an independent State of Palestine. The declaration made reference to UN resolutions without explicitly mentioning Security Council Resolutions 242 and 338.

A month later, Arafat declared in Geneva that the PLO would support a solution of the conflict based on these Resolutions. Effectively, the PLO recognized Israel's right to exist within pre-1967 borders, with the understanding that the Palestinians would be allowed to set up their own state in the West Bank and Gaza. The United States accepted this clarification by Arafat and began to allow diplomatic contacts with PLO officials. The Proclamation of Independence did not lead to a Palestinian State, although over 100 states recognized the "State of Palestine".

Persian Gulf War

In 1990, the PLO under Yasser Arafat openly supported Saddam Hussein in his regime's invasion of Kuwait, leading to a later rupture in Palestinian-Kuwaiti ties and the expulsion of many Palestinians from Kuwait.

Oslo Accords Restore Palestinian National Identity

In 1993, the PLO secretly negotiated the Oslo Accords with Israel. The accords were signed on 20 August 1993. There was a subsequent public ceremony in Washington D.C. on September 13, 1993 with Yasser Arafat and Yitzhak Rabin. The Accords granted the Palestinians right to self-government on the Gaza Strip and the city of Jericho in the West Bank through the creation of the Palestinian Authority. Yasser Arafat was appointed head of the Palestinian Authority and a timetable for elections was laid out which saw Arafat elected president in January 1996, 18 months behind schedule. Although the PLO and the PA are not formally linked, the PLO dominates the administration. The headquarters of the PLO were moved to Ramallah on the West Bank. On 9 September 1993, Arafat issued a press release stating that "the PLO recognizes the right of the State of Israel to exist in peace and security".

At the end of a rally in support of the Oslo Accords at the Kings of Israel Square in Tel Aviv, an Israeli citizen assassinated Prime Minister and Defense Minister **Yitzhak Rabin** on November 4, 1995. The assassin, Yigal Amir, a far-right-wing religious Zionist strenuously opposed Rabin's peace initiative and particularly the signing of the Oslo Accords. The assassination was the culmination of Israeli right-wing dissent over the Oslo Peace Process. Rabin, despite his extensive service in the Israeli military, was disparaged personally by right-wing conservatives and Likud leaders who perceived the Oslo peace process as an attempt to forfeit the occupied territories. Contrary to Likud's accusations, Rabin was focused on the consolidation of Israeli settlements in the occupied territories. He planned to give the PLO control of 90% of the West Bank's Arab population, while retaining 70% of the land in the occupied territories. In a speech to the Knesset, Rabin promised that Israel would continue to have "total freedom of action in order to fulfill the security aims that touch upon the permanent solution."

Nonetheless, hostility continued to mount against Rabin. Ultra-orthodox conservatives and Likud party leaders believed that withdrawing from any Jewish land was heresy. Rallies, organized partially by Likud, became increasingly extreme in tone. Likud Leader (and future Prime Minister) Benjamin Netanyahu accused Rabin's government of being "removed from Jewish tradition ... and Jewish values." Netanyahu addressed protesters of the Oslo movement at rallies where posters portrayed Rabin in a Nazi SS uniform or being the target by in the cross-hairs of a sniper. Rabin accused Netanyahu of provoking violence, a charge which Netanyahu strenuously denied.

Some Palestinian officials have stated that the peace treaty must be viewed as permanent. According to some opinion polls, a majority of Israelis believe Palestinians should have a state of their own—a major

shift in attitude after the Oslo Accord—even though both Yitzhak Rabin and Shimon Peres opposed the creation of a Palestinian state, both before and after the Accord. At the same time, a significant portion of the Israeli public and some political leaders (including the current Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu) express doubt over whether a peaceful, coherent state can be founded by the PLO, and call for significant re-organization, including the elimination of all terrorism, before any talk about independence.

Second Intifada

The Second or Al-Aqsa Intifada started concurrent with the breakdown of talks at Camp David with Israeli Prime Minister Ehud Barak. The Intifada never ended officially, but violence hit relatively low levels during 2005. The death toll both military and civilians of the entire conflict in 2000-2004 is estimated to be 3,223 Palestinians and 950 Israelis, although this number is criticized for not differentiating between combatants and civilians. Members of the PLO have claimed responsibility for a number of attacks against Israelis during the Second Intifada.

Palestinian National Charter

The Palestinian National Charter as amended in 1968, endorsed the use of "armed struggle" against "Zionist imperialism."

'Article 10 of the Palestinian National Charter states "Commando (Feday'ee) action constitutes the nucleus of the Palestinian popular liberation war. This requires its escalation, comprehensiveness, and the mobilization of all the Palestinian popular and educational efforts and their organization and involvement in the armed Palestinian revolution. It also requires the achieving of unity for the national ('wanted) struggle among the different groupings of the Palestinian people, and between the Palestinian people and the Arab masses, so as to secure the continuation of the revolution, its escalation, and victory."

The most controversial element of text of the Charter were many clauses declaring the creation of the state of Israel "null and void", because it was created by force on Palestinian soil. This is usually interpreted as calling for the destruction of the state of Israel. In letters exchanged between Arafat and Rabin in conjunction with the 1993 Oslo Accords, Arafat agreed that those clauses would be removed. On 26 April 1996, the Palestine National Council held a meeting in camera, after which it was announced that the Council had voted to nullify or amend all such clauses, and called for a new text to be produced. At the time, Israeli political figures and academics expressed doubt that this is what had actually taken place, and continued to claim that controversial clauses were still in force.

A letter from Arafat to US President Bill Clinton in 1998 listed the clauses concerned, and a meeting of the Palestine Central Committee approved that list. To remove all doubt, the vote this time was held in a public meeting of PLO, PNC and PCC members which was televised worldwide, and in the presence of Bill Clinton who traveled to the Gaza Strip for that purpose. Israel's Prime Minister Benjamin Netanyahu accepted this as the promised nullification. He later wrote, "While the PLO repeatedly committed itself to amend the charter..., no changes have been made despite occasional claims to the contrary." However, a new text of the Charter has not been produced, and this is the source of a continuing controversy. Critics of the Palestinian organizations claim that failure proves the insincerity of the clause nullifications.

D. Nasser and Pan-Arabism

As we have seen, the British overriding concern in the Middle East was the security of Suez Canal in Egypt. In the wake of World War I, Egyptian *Wafd* Party under the leadership of Sa'd Zaghul Pasha sought to secure independence inspired by President Woodrow Wilson's fourteen points, especially his principle of self-determination. The British tried to tighten their grip on their protectorate and Sultan Fuad, but it only strengthen their resolve for independence. The ranks of the Wafd Party swelled as thousands rushed to join. When the British exiled Zaghul to Malta, Egypt erupted in violence with riots, general strikes, burning of foreigner's houses and killing of British soldiers. Eventually, the British concluded that a compromise was the only solution and on February 28, 1922, gave up the protectorate in exchange for a treaty of alliance with an independent Egypt. Egypt was to be a constitutional monarchy and Sultan Fuad assumed the title of King (*Malik*). The British still maintained the right to defend Egypt, protect foreign interests, guide foreign policies and control the Suez Canal. The *Wafd* Party continued to press for complete independence from Britain and under Zaghul, grew in popularity and influence. The *Wafd* not only was politically active but led in strikes, riots and even terrorist activities. It dominated the political scene up until 1952 even achieving a majority in the Egyptian Parliament. Zaghul was made Prime Minister in 1924 and continued to push for the complete sovereignty of Egypt and Sudan. Egypt has always considered Sudan to be of prime strategic importance as the flow of the Nile River can be controlled from there. Paradoxically, Egyptians maintained loyalty to their king, mourned when King Fuad died in 1935 and promised their allegiance to his son, King Faruq. The 3-way power struggle between the monarchy and the Wafd Party and the British in Egypt continued to escalate. Also the same year, Zaghul died and this led to the fractioning of the Wafd Party, and more willingness to compromise. In 1936, the three antagonists entered into a treaty granting sovereignty to Egypt and Sudan in exchange for allowing the British access to airports, seaports and lines of communication and permission to station no more than 10,000 British troops and 400 pilots in the Suez Canal area. The Wafd Party accepted the treaty and consequently the Egyptian Parliament ratified it on December 22, 1936. Egypt was subsequently admitted to the League of Nations.

Muslim Brotherhood

Young Egyptian nationalists disdained the treaty and blamed the Wafd Party for compromising with the British. This was one of many factors giving rise to militant Muslim groups in the region. The rapid secularization of Egyptian society and the corresponding deterioration of Islamic law (*Sharia*) and institutions made them fear that Egypt would succumb to the same de-Islamization that befell Turkey under Ataturk. The largest and most influential of the Islamic militant groups was the Muslim Brotherhood (*Jam'iyat al-Ikhwān al-Muslimīn*). Formed in 1928 by a 22-year old school teacher Hasan al-Banna, it instilled a missionary zeal and strong militancy patterned after the medieval Isma'ili group, the Assassins. A strict Sunni after the model of the Wahhabis, al-Banna became the absolute leader of the Brotherhood or "General Guide" (*Murshid al-'Am*). His followers were called *da'l* or devotees and they maintained their headquarters in Cairo. The Muslim Brotherhood held to the sufficiency and the supremacy of Islam and the literal interpretation of the Quran and the Sunna. Unlike the Wahhabis, however, the Muslim Brotherhood believed in reform and the utilization of some Western ideas to keep Islam modern. It was strongly opposed to secularization and strived for reinstatement of Sharia law as the dominant factor controlling Islamic society. It emphasized government by Allah for Muslims, tolerance according to the Quran for minorities who were "people of the book" provided that they remain loyal to the government of Islam. "A strong

army,” the Brotherhood proclaimed, “is more important than prayer or fasting.” It called for military preparedness on the part of all Muslims everywhere (pan-Islamic). A secretive organization it is estimated that by 1939, its membership numbered 500,000 and grew to 2,000,000 by 1953. Most of its activities were carried out in subversive manner “underground”. Although they lacked a coherent platform or clear political agenda, they united with other groups in opposition to the ruling elite (monarchy and Wafd Party). Many members found their way into the Egyptian Officer Corps. In the latter 1940’s, they assassinated two Egyptian prime ministers, Ahmad Pasha and Nuqrashi Pasha. In retaliation, the government gunned down Hasan al-Banna in the streets. The Brotherhood struggled to recover after the loss of their leader as there was dissention among them. In 1952, the revolution came and the Muslim Brotherhood was not able to gain acceptance by the rising junta headed by Nasser and was forced to go underground.

Nasser’s Rise to Power

This was the background in which a brilliant young Egyptian army officer, Gamal Abd al-Nasser began his political career. Even in high school, Nasser had taken part in demonstrations for Egyptian independence. He had studied the life of Zaghul and other nationalists and the ideas of the Soviet revolution. After the war with Israel in 1948, he formed an organization of young army officers called the Free Officers with the specific aim of capturing political power. It consisted of two communist-oriented officers, five members of the Muslim Brotherhood and many ardent Egyptian nationalists uncommitted to any political ideology. By the early 1950’s the Free Officers grew in size to several hundred members. Although there was no common ideology, they were united by three principles: first, elimination of the monarchy, second, ending British imperialism in Egypt and third, using the armed forces to achieve these political objectives. Initially maintaining a clandestine posture to avoid government retaliation, they carried out assassinations of key political figures and conducted sporadic violence. Meanwhile the Muslim Brotherhood was staging increasing riots, general strikes and guerilla attacks against the canal zone and British forces. In January 1952, British forces declared martial law in the villages they controlled. The government felt hopeless. The Wafd Party had failed to achieve their goals by peaceable means. On July 23, 1952, the Young Officers saw their opportunity and staged a coup d’etat. King Faruq waited for British assistance which failed to materialize. Nasser’s forces took the capital with little resistance. King Faruq was forced to abdicate permanently. The Young Officers hoped to purge the government of corruption to allow an “honest” nationalistic civilian rule to take its place. When no one rose to the challenge, they decided to form a Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) instead. Trying to feel their way through the revolution, the inexperienced young officers enlisted the help of General Muhammad Nagib to serve as Prime Minister. The RCC dismissed some 800 ministers from government positions, retired some 100 senior military officers and banned all parties except the Muslim Brotherhood temporarily until the new government could be stabilized. As their first act of government the RCC began land reform (after the pattern of the Bolsheviks) in order to gain the popularity of the masses. The Free Officers had taken a bold stroke and their opponents were numerous and strong. They included the older politicians whose jobs were at stake, the Communists who had made a foothold in the region, the wealthy landlords whose fortunes were being affected by the land reform and eventually, the Muslim Brotherhood who disagreed with the secular approach the RCC was taking. Nasser rose to the forefront as the true head of the RCC, but General Nagib had acquired the popular support of the people and attributed to him the leadership of the revolution. In addition, Nagib demanded restoration of the Parliament, recalling in their day that some of these older politicians had nationalistic zeal. From these events grew a rift between Nasser and Nagib. When Nasser prematurely attempted to dismiss Nagib, it created an uproar in opposition to the RCC on Nagib’s behalf. The RCC was forced to reinstate Nagib, declare Egypt as a republic and promote Nagib to the

office of president. As Nagib tried to reform the revolution, Nasser worked to discredit him. In October 1954, a member of the Muslim Brotherhood made an unsuccessful assassination attempt on Nasser. The RCC sprang into action, outlawing the Muslim Brotherhood and purging its members from the RCC, accused Nagib of being an accomplice to the assassination and ousted him permanently. Nasser emerged as the acknowledged leader of the revolution and promised to institute constitution reform by 1956. He worked hard to gain the trust and respect of the Egyptian people. Following the assassination attempt, he climbed unscathed to the podium and proclaimed "My countrymen, my blood spills for you and for Egypt. I will live for your sake and die for the sake of your freedom and honor. Let them kill me; it does not concern me so long as I have instilled pride, honor and freedom in you. If Gamal Abdel Nasser should die, each of you shall be Gamal Abdel Nasser." The combination of Nasser's charisma and genuine desire to rejuvenate national pride was a huge success. He enacted agrarian reform, strengthened Egypt's infrastructure including the construction of the High Aswan Dam to control the flood stages of the Nile. In 1956, a new constitution was promulgated and the regime adopted socialist reform policies. In 1962, the political party became the Arab Socialist Union with an elaborate organization to ensure participation of the masses in the political process. Nevertheless, there was the ever present secret police or *mukhaberat* to strike fear in the hearts of Nasser's political opponents. All this took place at the height of the Cold War which polarized the globe into either the Communist bloc or free West camps. Up until now, the major Arab leaders such as the shah of Iran, King Hussein of Jordan, the Turkish ruling junta and the fledgling monarchs of the Arabian peninsula had all cast their lots among the Western powers. Nasser, partly out of despite for the imperialism of the British and partly to bolster his populist image joined the ranks of the non-aligned movement, espousing a policy of positive neutrality that in theory was not aligned with either the Communists or the West.

Suez War

In 1956, the United States had agreed to supply economic aid in order for Egypt to complete the Aswan Dam. When the US observed Nasser's socialist leanings, his attempts to bargain with USSR and China, his role in training Palestinian commandos (the Fedayi'in) to conduct raids on Israel and his rhetoric about "American imperialism", Secretary of State John Foster Dulles withdrew the financial aid offer. Enraged, Nasser reacted by nationalizing the Suez Canal on July 26, 1956. Britain and France tried every means in their political power to force Egypt to recant but were unsuccessful. Meanwhile, Israel invaded Egypt's Sinai peninsula in retaliation for the Fedayi'in attacks, advancing to canal zone. Nasser mobilized his forces on the other side confronting them. Britain and France, in apparently premeditated cooperation with Israel, sent an ultimatum to both sides to withdraw 10 miles from the canal. When Nasser refused, Anglo-French naval and air forces attacked and occupied Port Said. In a totally unexpected and unprecedented move, President Eisenhower came to Egypt's rescue and strongly censured Israel, France and Britain, demanding their immediate withdrawal. It was one of the only times in history that the US and USSR agreed together within the UN on any issue. As the allied forces withdrew, the UN peace-keeping forces were sent to secure the borders. Although Nasser suffered a military defeat, he achieved an overwhelming political victory, winning the admiring respect of Arabs all over the world. He soon became the liberator the Palestinians never had, the voice calling for Arab unity against Western imperialism.

Pan Arabism

Before long, in 1958, Syria and Egypt agreed to take a step toward Pan-Arabism and joined by forming the United Arab Republic (UAR) with Nasser as president. Other Arab leaders in Sudan, Libya and Yemen sought to form similar alliances as Pan-Arabism was at its apex. With all the pomp

and circumstance of Pan-Arabism in theory, the actual practice of it turned out to be more difficult than imagined. Within three short years of the fragile union, Egypt and Syria parted ways. Unlike Egypt, Syria was a complex tapestry of Arabs with widely varying ideologies Sunnis, Shi'is, Druzes, Isma'ilis and others. In addition there were scores of ethnic and religious minorities such as Catholics, Kurds, Turkomans, Circassians and Yazidis. Another 10% are roaming Bedouins who are adept at causing divisiveness. Syrians have never been able to speak with one voice as the individualism hinders their cooperation. Furthermore, a particular sect may be unified with another for one cause and the opposed to it for another cause. During a decade since Syria gained independence in 1946, there were nearly ten coup d'états and about as many rewritings of the constitution. The Ba'th (Resurrection) Party was formed in 1953 by the fusion of socialist, Pan-Arab parties one led by Michel Aflaq, a Christian and the other by Salah al-Bitar, a Sunni Muslim. Their ideology was secular, Pan-Arab and called for nationalization of industry. They at once identified with Nasser. Their main rival was the Communist Party in Syria. Ba'thist Parties were also formed in Iraq (Sadam Hussein's party), Lebanon and Jordan. It was the Syrian Ba'thists who, fearing a Communist Party coup in 1958, went to Cairo and proposed for a union with Egypt. With time, however, other groups in Syria such as moderates, businessmen, military leaders and conservatives realized that Syria was becoming a province of Egypt rather than a partner in a union. Restrictions were placed on the economy according to Egyptian needs. While the Ba'thists thought that things would work out for them in building the new National Union Party, Nasser never gave them the opportunity. Indeed, in the first elections held within the UAR in 1959, the Ba'thists were pushed out of government altogether. In addition, in applying his reforms to the UAR, Nasser failed to take into account the social, economic and agricultural differences between Egypt and Syria. To add insult to injury, Nasser made friends with Syria's enemies, namely King Hussein of Jordan, King Sa'ud of Arabia and worst of all the British! The latter occurred when in June 1961, the British ended their protectorate over the oil-rich Kuwait and declared it to be independent. The neighboring country of Iraq under the Communist dictator General Abd al-Karim Qasim (Iraq was second only to Syria in the number of coup d'états in ten years, namely 8), claimed Kuwait as a rogue territory of Iraq and immediately prepared to annex it (the Persian Gulf War of 1990 was de ja vu). Qasim was the sworn enemy of Nasser and thus Nasser could not allow Qasim to carry out his plan. The Arab world was astonished to see Nasser send Egyptian troops to fight with the British against another Arab country! The Syrians had enough. On September 28, 1961 Syrian officers stage a coup d'état (#11) and forced the Egyptians to leave. The Ba'thist Party was reinstated. Later, on February 8, 1963, the Ba'thists of Iraq staged a coup and executed Qasim and his Communist supporters. They never again attempted a union and the three countries Iraq, Syria and Egypt vied with one another to lead the charge against Israel and dreamed of one day having a Pan-Arab state.

Enter the Soviet Union and the 1967 Arab-Israeli War

After the failure of the UAR, the unpopular involvement in the Iraqi-Kuwait dispute and yet another misadventure in Yemen, Nasser's popularity and prestige began to wane. The civil war in Yemen, instead of promoting Pan-Arabism, intensified inter-Arab rivalries. Widely criticized, Nasser's enemies outnumbered friends. Palestinian activists were beginning to form and the Palestine Liberation Organization (PLO) accused frontline Arab states of forgetting their cause. They intended to bring the region into war with Israel and to this end the Fedayi'in launched numerous guerilla attacks against Israeli targets. Furthermore, Syria suffered as yet another coup d'état in 1966, this time the leadership was more sympathetic to the Palestinian cause. They invited the Soviet Union to supply them with modern arms, and the Soviets were more than happy to oblige. Adding to the tension which was already at a boiling point, there was a major dispute between Syria and Israel regarding water rights and border agricultural lands. Israel began massing troops along the Syrian border. In response, Nasser, not wanting

to lose face and hoping that Israel would be deterred by a show of solidarity, entered into a mutual defense pact with Syria. Despite a modest infusion of Soviet arms, Nasser realized that the combined Arab armies were woefully unprepared for war and unfamiliar with the latest Soviet weapons in their possession. In the period between Israel's War of Independence (1948) and the Six Day War (1967), the Syrians constantly harassed Israeli border communities by firing artillery shells from their dominant positions on the Golan Heights. In October 1966 Israel brought the matter up before the United Nations. Five nations sponsored a resolution criticizing Syria for its actions but it failed to pass due to a Soviet veto. When on April 7, 1967, Israel shot down six Syrian jets over Syrian territory in retaliation, Syria and Jordan criticised Nasser for not responding to defend Syria. Instead, Nasser intended to intimidate Israel. Egypt's troops mobilized to their border with Israel along the Sinai and Nasser called for removal of UN peace-keeping forces which had kept vigilance since 1956. What happened next pushed Israel beyond the limit, Egyptian troops occupied Sharm al-Shayk controlling the Straits of Tiran of the Gulf of Aqaba. On May 22, Egypt closed access to the Gulf of Aqaba to Israeli shipping and other shipping bringing supplies to Israeli port of Elat. By the end of May Egypt was joined by Jordan and Iraq in an alliance to repel any attack on any of their members. The Soviet Union was sympathetic with the Arab nations while the United States and Britain agreed with Israel that the closing of Aqaba, an international waterway, was an act of war. Israel was compelled to act preemptively against such overwhelming odds. In a lightning stroke, Israeli air and land forces swept into Arab land from Sinai to Syria starting June 5, 1967. In just two days Israeli jets annihilated the Egyptian, Syrian and Jordanian air forces mostly on the ground. From then on, Israeli forces enjoyed unchallenged air superiority and devastated ground forces. In six days the war was over. Israeli forces had taken the Sinai, West Bank and Golan Heights and annexed Old Jerusalem at a cost of less than 1,000 killed, 4,517 wounded, 15 captured and 46 aircraft lost while Arab forces suffered between 13,200–23,500 killed, 5,500+ captured, hundreds of tanks destroyed and 452+ aircraft destroyed. Israel captured nine Egyptian generals, over 300 officers, and millions of dollars worth in state of the art Soviet equipment, most of it undamaged. What was achieved was that Israel secured her borders and ports and multiplied the amount of land three fold. With the Sinai, Israel could prevent blockade of the Gulf of Aqaba and the Suez Canal. The Golan Heights allowed Israel to control the strategic heights commanding Sea of Galilee and upper Jordan River.¹ During Armistice talks of 1949, Israel called for the removal of all Syrian forces from the former Palestine territory. Syria refused, insisting on an armistice line based not on the 1923 international border but on the military status quo. The result was a compromise. Under the terms of an armistice signed on July 20, 1949, Syrian forces were to withdraw east of the old Palestine-Syria boundary. Israeli forces were to refrain from entering the evacuated areas, which would become a demilitarized zone.

At the commencement of hostilities, both Egypt and Israel announced that they had been attacked by the other country. Once it was established that Israel had struck first, the Israeli government claimed that it was a pre-emptive strike in the face of a planned invasion by the Arab countries. On the other hand, the Arab view was that it was an unjustified attack. Sources support both positions. On June 8, 1967 USS *Liberty*, a United States Navy electronic intelligence vessel sailing 13 nautical miles (24 km) off Arish (just outside Egypt's territorial waters), was attacked by Israeli jets and torpedo boats, nearly sinking the ship, killing 34 sailors and wounding 171. Israel said the attack was a case of mistaken identity, and that the ship had been misidentified as the Egyptian vessel *El Quseir*. Israel apologized for the mistake, and paid compensation to the victims or their families, and to the United States for damage to the ship. After an investigation, the U.S. accepted the explanation that the incident was friendly fire and the issue was closed by the exchange of diplomatic notes in 1987. The surviving crew members still claim, and present some evidence, that the attacks might have been deliberate.

Aftermath of the Six-Day War, Rise of the PLO and UN Resolution 242

All this was the beginning of the end for Nasser. He had started so well but now his humiliating defeat by the Israelis, the failure to unite Arabs into one blissful nation and now his own health was betraying him. On September 28, 1970, just after he finished negotiating a cease fire agreement between feuding Palestinian groups and Jordan's King Hussein, Nasser suffered a fatal heart attack. Despite all of Egypt's attempts to keep Nasserism alive, her role as the leader in forming a Pan-Arab nation died with him.

It seemed there was no end to conflict. The 1967 war had involved more than just contesting nations within the Middle East, but involved the whole world and nearly brought the US and Soviet Union into direct confrontation. The UN was intent on resolving it. British ambassador to the UN Lord Caradon labored intensely with a proposal for peace which declared "the inadmissability of the acquisition of territory by war and the need to work for a just and lasting peace in which every state in the area can live in peace". Proposing a compromise in which Israel traded "land for peace", the result was the UN's landmark Resolution 242 which passed the security Council on November 22, 1967. The resolution called for:

1. Withdrawal of Israeli forces from territories occupied in the recent conflict
2. Termination of all claims or state of belligerency and respect for the acknowledgment of the sovereignty, territorial integrity and political independence of every state in the area to live in peace within secure and recognized boundaries free from threats or acts of force.

The supreme importance of UN Resolution 242 cannot be overstated and is still very relevant to today's Middle East conflicts. Implicit within the language of the resolution is that if the Arabs agreed to it, they must recognize and respect the right of Israel to exist as sovereign state. Conversely,

The Palestinians surged forward. The PLO came out of obscurity and the Fedayi'in, now concentrated in Jordan with the loss of Gaza and the West Bank, stepped up their violence against Israel becoming more daring and effective in their attacks against Israeli targets. To the over 800,000 Palestinian refugees before the 1967 war, there were added another 400,000. The older Arab leaders, Nasser, PLO leader Ahmad Shuqairi and King Hussein of Jordan, washed their hands of the Palestinian cause. It was time for new leadership. Emerging in 1968 from the PLO was the new National Liberation Movement (Fatah) with its young leader Yassir Arafat. The ranks of Fatah were filled with younger, professional Palestinians whose families fled the 1967 war. The Fedayi'in grew so powerful as to threaten Jordan and make an attempt on the king's life in 1970. They hijacked three international airliners in September 1970 and after removing the hostages, blew them up. That's when the Jordanian forces moved in. In an intense, ten day battle that moved house-to-house in Amman and Irbid, Jordanian forces attempted to push the Fedayi'in out of Jordan. Syria responded to an appeal by Arafat for Arab nations to come to their aid by invading Jordan. As mentioned previously, Nasser begged the Syrians to refrain and they withdrew. He then succeeding in negotiating a cease fire agreement the day before his death. Within the next year, Jordanian forces delivered a crushing defeat to the Fedayi'in, driving them out of Jordan. The PLO relocated its headquarters to Beirut, Lebanon.

Era of Détente and Yom Kippur War

The mantle of Egypt's leadership fell on one Anwar Sadat. He, a friend and contemporary of Nasser, had been one of the original Free Officers. Because Sadat had been isolated from the internal political rivalries, Nasser had chosen him to be his natural successor. Still, Sadat had to

contend with powerful adversaries from the very first day of his presidency. In addition, Sadat lacked the charisma that propelled Nasser to the top of the popularity charts and never achieved the devotion and admiration of the masses that his predecessor enjoyed. By May of 1971, there was a failed coup by Nasser's former associates. Attempts to consolidate his regime by purges and arrests did little to make him feel secure as Sadat's powers remained tenuous well into 1973. It was the thought of Egypt's Sinai still remaining occupied by Israel and the persisting humiliation of the 1967 defeat that prompted Sadat to embark on an ambitious campaign to recover his reputation. In the face of a struggling economy, it took years to rebuild his armed forces. To do it, he had to sell his soul to the Soviet Union. By September 1971, the Soviets supplied some 450 new MiG fighters, 100 warships, 1,350 tanks and an undetermined number of state-of-the-art SAM batteries in exchange for the presence of some 15,000-20,000 Russian "advisors". In addition, Soviet Navy warships protected Alexandria and Port Said. Ironic, how that Egypt had come into bondage once again, now under Communist "imperialism". Eventually, Egypt and Syria realized that another war was inevitable and the only way their "stolen" borders could be restored. Hardened by the ever increasing Palestinian violence, the Israelis viewed the post-1967 borders as necessary buffers to maintain their security. Prime Minister Golda Meir viewed the Arab position as too weak to seriously consider negotiations and opted to strengthen Israel's hold on the Golan Heights, West Bank and Sinai rather than accept the "land for peace" proposal of the UN Resolution 242 for their security. Egypt's "war of attrition" only served to further Israel's distrust of Sadat's motives. They continued to build more settlements and industries in the occupied territories making it clear that they had no intention to leave them. Now Sadat felt that his mind was made up: it was time for war. In 1972, he kicked the 15,000 Russians out of Egypt to get the meddlers out of the way.

Following the example of the Israelis in 1967, Egypt struck preemptively on October 6, 1973 during the month of Ramadan and the Jewish Yom Kippur (Day of Atonement). In a brilliantly coordinated attack, Egyptian forces spilled across the Suez Canal in an amphibious assault while commandos were airlifted deep into Sinai behind Israeli forces. Meanwhile Syrian forces recaptured the entire Golan Heights in one day. Apparently, the attack was not anticipated by Israeli intelligence and her armed forces were caught unprepared. In an attempt to recover, Israeli Air Force fighters raced to the rescue only to become victims of the new Soviet SAMs. Some 40 aircraft were lost in the first few days. Some 700 Egyptian tanks charged into the Sinai and were counterattacked by Israeli armor in the largest tank battle since World War II. Israeli efforts were failing to contain the invasion forces and it was evident that things had changed dramatically since the 1967 war. In an emergency effort to save Israel, the United States rushed everything from aircraft to tanks on its aircraft carriers and merchant ships to Israeli ports. In some cases F-4 fighter aircraft were taken from active duty US Air Force squadrons and brought to Israel in order to replace the losses. In a bold stroke, Major General Ariel Sharon led Israeli Defense Forces (IDF) across the Suez, flanking the Egyptian army on Egyptian soil and inflicting heavy losses. Having gained such unexpected successes within the first few days, Syrian and Egyptian leaders wavered as they decided what to do next. It was during this time that the IDF recovered from shock, sprang into action and began to turn the tide. Meanwhile, US Secretary of State Henry Kissinger was feverishly flying from capitol to capitol, trying to work out a cease-fire (his famous "shuttle diplomacy"). By the third week of October 1973, the Golan Heights had been recovered and Israeli forces began driving deep into Syria in order to damage their economy. Syria's only refinery, in Homs, was seriously damaged by Israeli aircraft along with the ports at Baniyas, Tartus and Latakia. Israeli forces were moving toward Damascus itself. In the Sinai, IDF troops had broken through Egyptian lines and completely encircled the Egyptian Third Army deep into Egyptian territory. By October 23, all parties finally agreed to a cease fire. UN Resolution 338 called for cease fire, forces to hold their positions,

begin steps to enact to UN Resolution 242 and negotiations were to start between the parties concerned under appropriate auspices aimed at establishing a just and durable peace.

Unlike the 1967 War, the 1973 War (Yom Kippur or Ramadan) the Arab entities were Syria and Egypt with minimal participation by Iraq (sent 12 MiGs) and a token involvement by Jordan (dispatched an armored brigade) and for the first time Israel was heavily supported by the United States. It was conceived and coordinated by Sadat and nearly succeeded in defeating the IDF initially. The final outcome was somewhat of a draw without major territorial gains on either side but it had profound impact upon all the parties involved in the Arab-Israeli conflict. The ideas that Israel was invincible and that the Arab armies were incompetent were shattered. However, even if Arabs could mount effective attacks against Israel, they could not overcome Israel with American military aid. Both sides had mutual respect for the other's potential and this opened doors for renewed negotiations which were previously closed.

Egypt's Struggle After 1973 War

Sadat emerged as a new figure leading Arab politics. He grew confident enough to pursue diplomacy independent of the other Arab contenders but in so doing only widened the breach between Egypt and the other Arab states. In 1974, Henry Kissinger negotiated a cease fire agreement between Egypt and Israel and later Syria and Israel. Partly due to disagreements with Arab (mainly Syria, Libya, and Iraq) and communist allies, Egypt opted to settle a separate agreement with Israel instead of holding out for a comprehensive peace settlement involving the other the other Arab states. With the ever-increasing importance of America's involvement, Sadat realized that the only way to reclaim the Sinai was to prove his sincerity to both Israel and the US. On November 19, 1977, he shocked the world and flew directly to Jerusalem, which in effect was recognition of Israel as a state. The basic message of Sadat's speech at the Knesset were the request for the implementation of Resolutions 242 and 338. Like Sadat, Begin also saw many reasons why bilateral talks would be in his country's best interests. It would afford Israel the opportunity to negotiate only with Egypt instead of with a larger Arab delegation that might make unwelcome or unacceptable demands. Israel felt Egypt could help protect Israel from other Arabs and Eastern communists. In addition, the commencement of direct negotiations between leaders – summit diplomacy – would distinguish Egypt from her Arab neighbors. In September 1978, US President Jimmy Carter invited Sadat and Israeli Prime Minister Menachem Begin to the Camp David retreat to work on the peace process. The result was the Camp David Accords signed in March 1979 in which Israel agreed to a phased withdrawal from Sinai including 4,500 civilian inhabitants and restore it to Egypt in exchange for normal diplomatic relations with Egypt, guarantees of freedom of passage through the Suez Canal and other nearby waterways (such as the Straits of Tiran), and a restriction on the forces Egypt could place on the Sinai peninsula, especially within 20–40 km from Israel. This process would take three years to complete. Israel also agreed to limit its forces a smaller distance (3 km) from the Egyptian border, and to guarantee free passage between Egypt and Jordan. With the withdrawal, Israel also returned Egypt's Abu-Rudeis oil fields in western Sinai, which contained long term, commercially productive wells. The normalization of relations [between Israel and Egypt] went into effect in January 1980. Ambassadors were exchanged in February. The boycott laws were repealed by Egypt's National Assembly the same month, and some trade began to develop, albeit less than Israel had hoped for. In March 1980 regular airline flights were inaugurated. Egypt also began supplying Israel with crude oil. The years 1979-1980 brought trouble both without and within for Egypt. Arab leaders met in Baghdad and except for Oman and the Sudan, all agreed on imposing economic, diplomatic and political sanctions against Egypt and expelling the latter from the Arab League. Once the leader of Arab unity, Egypt was now virtually isolated from it. Although most Egyptians received news of the peace accord well, many were uneasy about the lack of settlement

on issues regarding Palestinians, Gaza or the West Bank as well as the loss of Egypt's prestige in the Arab world. Sadat distanced himself from the masses as he acquired a reputation extravagant living while he became more authoritarian and intolerant of dissent. Some of the major reasons for the rise in anarchy in Egypt were the failure of socialism under Nasser and now capitalism (*Infitah*) and the influx of Western aid under Sadat to generate noticeable improvements. People groped for moral guidance. Almost 30 years of secular government under Nasser and Sadat had left the people in a state of social malaise. The Muslim Brotherhood which Nasser disbanded, Sadat allowed to resume with some activity as long as it didn't become a political party. It began a highly successful recruiting campaign among university students and recent graduates who were facing the realities of low-paying jobs. Other more militant Islamic groups formed secretly, including *al-Jihad* (secret struggle) and *al-Takfir wa al-Hijrah* (Excommunication and Emigration). These groups held in common the conviction that the present regime was impious, too flirtatious with the West (in particular the United States) and it was the duty of Muslims to overthrow the government and restore the preeminence of *Shari'ah* (Islamic law). Residents of Cairo staged a number of demonstrations of protest against the government. Some 1,500 arrests were made of members of various Islamic militants. On October 6, 1981, while viewing a military parade, Sadat was assassinated by a platoon of some 23 soldiers passing the review stands led by Lieutenant Khalid al-Islambouli, a member of al-Jihad. Islambouli and three co-conspirators were tried and executed by firing squad but Islambouli is considered a martyr and there are "al-Islambouli brigades" in al-Qaeda and militant Chechen groups.

The Oil Factor

A new factor influencing the West's involvement in the 1973 war and the economy of the entire world was oil.

Sadat's successor was Vice President Hosni Mubarak, a professional soldier who had no political aspirations but was a strong leader. A Soviet-trained fighter pilot, Mubarak served with distinction as commander of Egyptian Air Force during the 1973 war. During his early years as the new President of Egypt, Mubarak appeared to be guiding the country toward democratic reform. The elections of 1984 were the most open since 1952, permitting the once disbanded *Wafd* party to participate. The Wafd gained enough seats in Parliament to become the largest opposition group. With time, Mubarak's reluctance to support major reform became apparent and the regime backed away from further political liberalization. From government pressure via patronage or intimidation and from internal conflicts the Wafd was soon fractionated, dampening public enthusiasm for the new regime and engendered apathy toward the electoral process. The most persistent opposition to Mubarak's regime came from diverse Islamic groups within the country. How Mubarak managed to stay in power even to the present time reflects the power of the military in country. The state deployed force to crush the more militant Islamic groups while simultaneously attempting to co-opt more moderate political organizations. Never-the – less portions of Egyptian society embraced portions of the Islamist programs.

Mubarak's foreign policy was limited by the Camp Davis Accords, a budding relationship with the United States and a faltering economy. These factors side-lined Egypt in the 1980's during Israel's invasion of Lebanon and thus diminished Egypt's influence within the region during the period. Economic necessity compelled Mubarak to turn to America but many question the wisdom of what they considered subjecting Egypt to a new form of Western imperialism. The Egyptian military received billions of dollars of aid from the United States each year, stemming from the Camp David Accords. Despite the obstacles that an alliance with the US and the Camp David Accords with Israel imposed, Egypt's reintegration in the Arab world was achieved by Mubarak through patience and methodical diplomacy. Egypt was

readmitted to the Arab league in 1989 and within two years, Cairo was restored to its former position as League headquarters.

The Egyptian population's dissatisfaction with their government intensified during the 1990's. Although the United States forgave half of Egypt's debt and maintained the annual \$2.3 billion aid package as reward for Egypt's participation in the allied coalition during the 1991 Persian Gulf War, the government's economic performance was dismal. There was rising unemployment and an ever-widening income gap between the few thousand wealthy Egyptians and the general population. In the 1995 parliamentary elections there was more fraud, vote-rigging and repression of the opposition than in previous elections. Islamic militants launched a full-scale insurrection with intent to overthrow Mubarak's regime. In 1992, full-scale clashes between insurgents and government security forces erupted. Although loosely organized, the Islamic groups received inspiration from the *al-Jama'at al-Islamiyyah* organization. In an effort to topple the government, they targeted Egypt's main economic industry, tourism. The most devastating incident occurred in the fall of 1997, when militants massacred more than 60 foreign tourists near Luxor. The dissidents consisted of largely poorer, less-educated young radicals who suffered most from the country's failing economy. Mubarak responded with a brutal crackdown on the insurgents. Security forces raided Cairo neighborhoods and country villages in south and central Egypt. Massive arrests resulted in hundreds of executions and thousands being detained. It was in this setting that one detainee, **Ayman al-Zawahiri**, a surgeon founded an Egyptian terrorist organization that later became part of Osama bin Laden's al-Qa'ida. Advancing up to the number two position in al-Qa'ida's organization, it was Zawahiri that argued that an attack on the United States and its Western allies would be the surest way to defeat the atheistic Mubarak regime. He reasoned that by eliminating US subsidization of the Middle East's corrupt governments would ensure that they would fall economically. Egyptian Islamic radicals who joined Zawahiri were originally few in number, his brutality being largely rejected on moral grounds by the other Islamic groups. The Muslim Brotherhood took a more centralist position, advocating for a new society based on democracy, respect for human rights and social justice within the context of the Quran. By the 1990's the Brotherhood established a myriad of charitable institutions, hospitals, day care centers and legal aid societies. Members of the Muslim Brotherhood and other Islamic moderates dominated the professional societies of doctors, lawyers, engineers and journalists. Not only did such groups promote social activism, but also increased participation in Quran study groups and resurgence of Sufism. Mubarak used the violence of the radical insurgents as a pretext to attack the peaceful moderates as well. In late February 2005, Mubarak announced in a surprise television broadcast that he had ordered the reform of the country's presidential election law, paving the way for multi-candidate polls in the upcoming presidential election but the restrictions on the candidate process help ensure that the incumbent would be re-elected. Although outlawed as a political party, the Muslim Brotherhood was permitted to run individual candidates as independents. Despite government opposition, the Brotherhood managed to win 20% of the parliamentary seats. After the 2005 presidential elections, Egyptian judges criticized the government for alleged interference in the election process through fraud and vote-rigging, and police brutality and violence by pro-Mubarak supporters against opposition demonstrators. After the election, Mubarak imprisoned Ayman Nour, the runner-up in Egypt's 2005 presidential elections, calling into question Egypt's commitment to democracy, freedom, and the rule of law. The Muslim Brotherhood's support for the judges made them the brunt of the government crackdown, but this only served to increase their popularity and further isolate the Mubarak regime from the majority of its citizens. Most Egyptians were skeptical about the process of democratization and the intent of the election rules. Less than 25% of the country's 32 million registered voters (out of a population of more than 72 million) turned out for the 2005 elections. In 2007, constitutional changes voted on by parliament prohibit parties from using religion as a basis for political activity, allow the drafting of a new anti-terrorism law, authorize broad

police powers of arrest and surveillance, give the president power to dissolve parliament and end judicial election monitoring. Opposition members of parliament abstained from voting on the proposed changes. Over 75% of those who participated in the referendum approved the constitutional amendments that curb the activity of opposition elements, particularly Islamists.

Egypt's political risks ahead

February 11, 2011: After daily mass protests and deaths in clashes with security forces and regime loyalists, Mubarak steps down and leaves Cairo for Sharm el-Sheikh on the Red Sea.

13: The army suspends the constitution and says it will rule Egypt for six months, at which point elections will take place.

March 11: Four top members of the Mubarak regime jailed on charges of ordering security forces to shoot protesters during the revolution, which left 846 people dead and 6,000 injured.

15: The army disbands the former regime's hated security police.

19: Voters approve the proposed new constitution, with 77.2 per cent voting "yes."

30: The military regime announces a parliamentary election for September, to be followed by a presidential ballot one or two months later.

April 13: Authorities say Mubarak and his two sons have been detained for 15 days as part of an inquiry into the January-February events. The former president is reported to have suffered heart problems during questioning.

16: The Higher Administrative Court dissolves Mubarak's National Democratic Party and orders the seizure of its assets.

May 7: Fifteen die and 200 injured as Muslims and Christians clash in Cairo.

17: Suzanne Mubarak, the wife of the ex-president, freed after remitting her assets to the state.

June 6: The Muslim Brotherhood's new political party is declared legal.

22: The Muslim Brotherhood joins forces with 17 other parties, including liberal and secular groups.

28: A Cairo court orders the dissolution of local councils whose representatives were elected under Mubarak's regime.

29: 1,036 injured in clashes between protesters and anti-riot police in Cairo's Tahrir Square.

July 5: A former minister sentenced in absentia to five years in jail and three others acquitted in corruption trials.

7: The public prosecutor refers 25 people to trial for murder during one of the most bloody days of the uprising.

13: The ruling military council seeks to placate protesters by announcing the sacking of hundreds of police officers and a delay of parliamentary elections.

15: Thousands rally across Egypt, capping a week of nationwide sit-ins to demand political change as anger grows with the military rulers.

17: Mubarak in a coma, state television cites his lawyer as saying, a report denied by the health ministry.

19: Mubarak has an abnormal heart rhythm and sometimes falls unconscious, the official MENA news agency reports.

21: A sweeping cabinet reshuffle fails to appease protesters as it retains several ministers they want sacked.

23: Fierce clashes between protesters angry at the military's handling of the transition from Mubarak's regime and army loyalists.

25: A Cairo court decides to merge the trials of Mubarak and ex-interior minister Habib al-Adly as former premier Ahmed Nazif is charged with corruption.

27: Mubarak refusing food and has become extremely weak, state media report.

29: Hundreds of thousands of Islamists pack Cairo's Tahrir Square, in the biggest gathering since Mubarak's fall.

31: Protesters camped out in Tahrir Square say they will suspend their sit-in during Ramadan, which starts on Monday.

August 1: The Army cracks down on protestor encampments in Tahrir Square.

Egypt's military, in charge since an 18-day popular revolt ousted President Hosni Mubarak on Feb. 11, says it wants to hand power to civilians as soon as possible and has set a timeline for a parliamentary election that will start the process.

8:00AM BST 02 Aug 2011

No one doubts the army will ensure a free and fair vote, nor do most question that it wants to quit day-to-day government.

But many protesters believe the army, with its vast business interests and which provided Egypt's rulers for six decades, will seek to keep a hand on the levers of power. This has fuelled tension on the streets and sometimes violent clashes.

Coupled with that are tensions between groups who initially galvanised protests against Mubarak by putting nationalism above religion and the Islamists like the Muslim Brotherhood who have shown they can also mass supporters on the street.

Here are some of the main political risks ahead:

*** ROLE OF THE MILITARY**

The Supreme Council of the Armed Forces, which took control when Mubarak was driven out, has seemed eager to transfer government back to civilians.

It has set a timeline for a parliamentary election, with voting expected in November, with a presidential election afterwards, possibly early next year. After a new parliament is elected the process of drawing up a new constitution will start.

The army was the only pillar of the establishment to survive intact after Mubarak's party collapsed. It controls a big chunk of the economy, possibly between 10 and 30 per cent according to some analysts. In future, it may seek a role as guardian of national security, which could provide a broad remit to intervene.

That could lead to tension with protesters and, in the longer term, civilian governments as it has in Turkey, whose military ousted four governments since 1960 although the power of Turkish generals has now been reined in.

*** FALTERING ECONOMY**

One reason the army may be keen to get out of day-to-day government is to avoid taking the blame for the tough decisions needed to revive confidence in the battered economy. Those policies will deflate the wild expectations of many about a rapid improvement in living standards with Mubarak's downfall.

The budget deficit has ballooned after tourists packed their bags and foreign investors fled, shaking two pillars of the economy.

The previous finance minister negotiated a \$3 billion loan package with the International Monetary Fund, but after a deal with few strings attached was agreed, Egypt turned it down, in part because the army said it did not want to build up debts.

The move followed a revision of the 2011/2012 budget, cutting the forecast deficit to 8.6 per cent from 11 per cent. Economists say this is optimistic and leaves Egypt more dependent on handouts from Gulf Arab states and others.

The economy contracted in the first part of the year and will struggle to register significant growth this year. Before the uprising, the economy was heading back to the six per cent-plus growth reached before the world financial crisis.

*** COUNTDOWN TO ELECTIONS**

With a parliamentary election expected in November, there is little time for groups to organise in the vacuum left by Mubarak, who crushed dissent, blocked new parties forming and ensured legal opposition parties posed no serious challenge.

Youth groups who galvanised protesters against Mubarak and put national pride before religion have yet to show they can create a coherent political movement – or whether they want to. They have been effective in pushing the army to concede ground in purging the system of officials from Mubarak's era and over other demands, suggesting that whatever the colour of the new government, these groups will continue to hold it to account.

Tensions with Islamist groups have grown. Groups of Salafists, who follow a strict interpretation of Islam, put on a show of strength in demonstrations on July 29 with chants such as "Islamic, Islamic, we don't want secular." The Muslim Brotherhood criticised groups who withdrew from the July 29 in protest at the religious slogans used. The Brotherhood, which takes a conservative but less strict line than Salafists, has formed a political party and remains Egypt's most organised group.

But the level of support for Islamists is unclear and there are signs it is not overwhelming. A study by the Abu Dhabi Gallup Center, showed nine out of 10 Egyptians surveyed planned on voting in elections. But the Brotherhood won the support of just 15 per cent of respondents.

Protesters have voiced concern that the remnants of Mubarak's now-disbanded National Democratic Party (NDP) could regroup in another form. In the Gallup poll, the NDP secured the support of 10 per cent of would-be voters.

That suggests there will be a fragmented political landscape, with no single group able to sweep up a clear majority in any vote, although Islamists – if they join ranks – may still be able to muster a big voice. The Brotherhood has not outlined its policy plans, although it has said it will not force Islamic law on Egypt and is not opposed to business.

The outcome of the presidential election is just as unclear. Contenders include former Arab League chief Amr Moussa, retired diplomat Mohamed ElBaradei and a range of other candidates, less well-known abroad but some with extensive campaign networks. An online poll conducted by the army put ElBaradei first with a quarter of 270,000 votes registered.

In this environment, the army may find it easier to influence the direction of debate, should it wish, once it has handed over the day-to-day government to others to take the blame for any policy shortfalls.

The Iranian Revolution

Iran has enjoyed the benefit of oil revenues unhindered by political ties with Arab states (they are mostly Persian). The shah, Muhammad Reza Pahlavi, was buoyed by unprecedented economic growth in the early 1970s. By 1975, things began to change. The shah's White Revolution was viewed by Iranian Islamic clerics as offensive and demeaning to their position and prestige. Opposition to these changes was spearheaded by the cleric, Ruhollah Khomeini. A sudden deficit came about in 1975 as mismanagement and corruption at all levels within the government began to take its toll as well as a fall in oil prices on which their economy depended. 1976 fared no better and despite shake-ups within

the cabinet ministers, the shah's demise was inevitable. He tried to appeal to America, but President Jimmy Carter's concern for human rights made him reluctant to help the struggling monarch. A popular movement began to gain momentum under the leadership of four separate groups: the older opposition parties, the National Front and the communist Tudeh Party; the guerilla organizations composed primarily of university students, Mujahedeen-e Khalq and the Fedayeen-e Kahlq; an independent group composed of intellectuals from academia and the most effective, the clerics, a mixed body of Islamic religious leaders of varying political persuasions. Rather than reform, the regime dealt harshly with the opposition and cracked down on strikes and protests. The secret police SAVAK, were efficient and brutal, quickly ferreting out leaders of the opposition and administering "field justice". The clerics enjoyed some distinct advantages, however. Immune from the wrath of SAVAK, they could bend the public ear with their sermons as the mosques were (and are) popular social gathering places free from government interference. The sermons were filled with double talk that could easily shift from religious to political at the right moment. They were readily understood and emotionally compelling, and began to spark the interest of the disenchanting Iranian masses. The old ayatollah (high ranking Twelver Shi'ite cleric) Rouhollah Khomeini, exiled by the shah to Iraq back in 1963, began to call for overthrow of the shah's regime. The gathering revolution was starting to identify with the Ayatollah Khomeini as the consolidating leader as more and more Iranians referred to him as "the imam" (for Shi'ites, this is very significant, being comparable to the second coming of Christ for them). Under pressure from the shah, the Iraqi government expelled the ayatollah from the city of Najaf, a Shi'ite center in southern Iraq. After relocating to Paris, Khomeini was surrounded by a number of Western-educated Iranians who then were sent out to spread the message that the shah's reign was illegal and that it was the Muslim's duty to depose him. By the beginning of 1979, millions of Iranians were pouring into the streets on a daily basis, chanting demands to abolish the monarchy, kill the shah and bring back Khomeini. The army was paralyzed by as many as 1,000 to 1,200 desertions a day of conscripts, unwilling to harm their fellow Iranians, joined in the protests. On January 16, 1979, Muhammad Reza Shah fled the country to Egypt. When the Ayatollah Khomeini did return to Tehran on February 1, 1979, millions of jubilant Iranians lined the streets. The revolution succeeded with very little bloodshed, however it was a very precarious situation with total anarchy, chaos and uncertainty that prevailed until 1982. Organizations ranging from the political left to far right and Islamic clerics vied to fill the power vacuum. More moderate reformers pressed for constitutional regime while clerics sought to establish an Islamic theocracy. Khomeini refused to recognize any former members of the shah's government and forced their resignations. He appointed Mehdi Bazargan as interim prime minister, tasked to restore administrative and economic stability to Iran. He and his moderate lay cabinet ministers sought to rein in autonomous revolutionary organizations which challenged the provisional government authority and establish a secular government. In February 1979, revolutionary tribunals staffed by Islamic judges passed judgment on former government officials and opponents accused of resisting the revolution. Hundreds of executions were performed including cabinet ministers, members of parliament, SAVAK agents and high-ranking military officers. In May, Khomeini established the Council of the Islamic Republic and the Revolutionary Guard, a military force distinct from the military. The Guard was deployed against the opponents of the revolution and played an important role in the victory of the Khomeini coalition. The Council was composed mainly of ulama and guided by the over-ruling authority of Khomeini. In addition, Khomeini formed the Islamic Republic Party (IRP) with two major goals: establish the popular support of the Islamic Republic and undermine the secular moderates. It was composed of Khomeini's closest *ayatollahs* (Persian "sign of God" a high ranking cleric of Shi'ite "Twelvers" and expert in Islamic jurisprudence, ethics and philosophy). The parliament was replaced with an Assembly of Experts, the majority of which were ulama. When Bazargan's government drafted a constitution in June 1979, although it established an Islamic state, it granted no special administrative or judicial powers to the religious establishment. Khomeini addressed the Assembly and informed the delegates that the

constitution should be based “one hundred percent on Islam”. The Assembly the completely restructured the constitution, requiring all articles to be based on Islamic law. Frustrated by clerical opposition to his domestic policies and attempts to remain friendly to the United States, Bazargan resigned in November 1979. While the constitution established some measure of popular participation in the governing process by electing a president and appointing members of the single-chamber national assembly of **Majlis** (Persian “assembly”), ultimate authority was placed in the hands of non-elected officials, most of whom were ulama. Thus was set in motion the forces that would lead to widespread discontent with the government after the dominating Ayatollah Khomeini passed from the scene in 1989.

Iranian Hostage Crisis November 1979

The Carter Administration angered Iranian revolutionaries with two events: President Carter’s New Year’s toast to the Shah of Iran and then, subsequent to the shah’s fleeing Iran in February 1979, permitting the shah to receive cancer treatment at Mayo Clinic. Khomeini declared the US as the “Great Satan”. Young radical supporters of Khomeini and the Islamic Republic, Muslim Student Followers of the Imam's Line took the US embassy in Tehran, holding 52 US Foreign Service personnel hostage, leading to a bitter diplomatic fallout with the United States. Intending only to hold them a few days, the students demanded that the Shah return to Iran for trial and execution, the US apologize for interfering with the internal affairs of Iran (especially in 1953) and the release of Iranian assets frozen in the US. It is unclear why the protesters held the hostages longer than intended but Khomeini’s endorsement, President Carter’s impotent response, appealing for the release of hostages on humanitarian grounds rather than delivering an ultimatum and the surge of popular Iranian response seemed to make them unwilling to give in. Both Iran’s leftist political groups and the Islamic Republic Party expressed approval of the take-over of the American Embassy. The Ayatollah Khomeini told Iran’s president:

“This action has many benefits. ... This has united our people. Our opponents do not dare act against us. We can put the constitution to the people's vote without difficulty, and carry out presidential and parliamentary elections.”¹

As some of the student leaders had hoped, Iran's moderate prime minister [Mehdi Bazargan](#) and his cabinet resigned under pressure just days after the event.

The crisis lasted 444 days including an aborted rescue attempt, Operation Eagle Claw, by the US military. In April 1980, eight large rescue helicopters embarked on the aircraft carrier Nimitz flew into the Iranian desert on an ill-fated mission to recover the hostages. A sand storm and faulty instrumentation stalled two helicopters at a rendezvous point while a third was lost along with eight crew members after a mid-air collision with a C-130 tanker. After the mission and its failure were made known publicly Khomeini's prestige skyrocketed in Iran as he credited divine intervention on behalf of Islam for the result. Iranian officials who favored release of the hostages, such as President Bani-Sadr, were weakened. In America, President Carter's political popularity and prospects for being reelected in 1980 were further damaged after a television address on April 25, in which he explained the rescue operation. Carter’s desperate attempts to secure hostages’ release were all in vain, the hostages remained in captivity until they were released at the moment President Reagan was inaugurated on January 20, 1981. The hostage crisis had these four important consequences:

1. It consolidated popular support in Iran for Khomeini’s Islamic revolution.
2. It destroyed all hope for Iranian moderates gaining control of the government and for restoring relations with the US
3. It removed all potential for President Carter’s reelection in 1980.

4. It made Iraq's Saddam Hussein confident that he could attack Iran without the intervening of the US.

With the new constitution approved by the Majlis in 1979, the principle of *vilayat-i faqih*, the governance of the Islamic jurist on behalf of the Hidden Imam began. Khomeini was established as the supreme Islamic jurist, with wide-ranging constitutional powers including the right to appoint half the members of the Council of Guardians, the commander-in-chief of the armed forces, the Revolutionary Guards and the heads of the army, navy and air force. He had the power to rule on the qualifications of candidates for president and to confirm the president's election. The imams had been propelled from being strictly interpreters of the law to rulers themselves. The first president of the Islamic Republic, Abol Hasan Bani-Sadr, was elected in 1980. Bani-Sadr was a devotee of Khomeini while studying in Paris. He understood Western law and although he was committed to preservation of Iran's Islamic cultural identity, he was a moderate opposed to the growing dominance of imam. His resounding election victory was not so much a result of his popularity as it was his close association with Khomeini. His short and chaotic presidency was devoted to attempts to stop the ulama take-over of the government, curb the excess of the Revolutionary Guards, bring the local committees and revolutionary tribunals under the central government and negotiate a settlement of the Iranian hostage crisis. Supported by members of the professional middle class, Bani-Sadr found himself politically isolated as Khomeini and the IRP enjoyed the popular support of the masses. Khomeini finally abandoned him and in 1981 allowed him to be impeached. In two short years, Iran lost its first Prime Minister and President, both of whom advocated some restraint on the ulama's control of then government. Now the way was clear for Khomeini and the IRP to consolidate their grip on power. This brought about two new problems. During the second half of 1981, the militant Islamic Left (Mujahedin-i Khalq) carried out a wave of terrorist bombings resulting in the deaths of dozens of religious and political leaders. In addition Saddam Hussein's invasion of Iran began on 1980 and served to further rally support for Khomeini and the Islamic Republic but at very great cost. Over 260,000 Iranians were killed and 1.6 million made homeless. Iranian cities and industries adjacent to Iraq were decimated. Fortunately for Iran, the war was financed from current reserves rather than borrowing from abroad, unlike Iraq. Although Iran emerged from the war without the crippling indebtedness strapping Iraq, there was a failure on the part Council of Guardians to formulate a coherent economic policy by the time Khomeini died in 1989. There was growing unrest as the people expected rewards for their self-sacrifice. Spontaneous land grabs by peasants and confiscations by local revolutionary courts resulted in government sponsored land reform. In a futile attempt to gain control the government proclaimed sweeping land reform law confiscating medium and large landholdings and redistributing these to landless peasants. Some of the ulama were large landholders and protested, claiming the Shari'a Law also defended the right of private property. The Council of Guardians vetoed the land reform law and left the issue unresolved. This with the rulings that protected the interests of the ulama began to arouse public suspicions that the religious establishment was taking advantage of their position of power.

The fears of the moderate leaders in Iran were realized as Iran became more and more isolated from the international community in the 1980s. Statements by Khomeini and the Council of Guardians made clear that the goal of the Iranian revolution was to establish a universal Islamic order. This alarmed the leaders of the Arab states whose regimes were already precariously situated. It was well known that Iran supported radical Shi'a groups within Lebanon. Thus with exception of Syria and Libya, the Arab states sided with Iraq in the Iran-Iraq War. The goal of the revolution was to shake off all dependence on foreign powers and, in the words of Khomeini, become "neither East nor West". Iran had a centuries-old distrust of Russia and no intention of playing into Moscow's hand in the place of Washington's. Consequently, the Reagan administration in its quest to end the Cold War, while recognizing the strategic importance of Iran, was at a loss of how to deal with it.

"Irangate" or the Iranian Contra Scandal

The hostage crisis in Tehran precipitated other hostage situations. In Lebanon, the Iran-backed Shi'i extremist group Hezbollah, whose members were trained by the Iranian Revolutionary Guard Corps (IRGC), seized Hezbollah is reputed to have been among the first Islamic resistance groups to use tactical suicide bombing, assassination, and capturing foreign soldiers in the Middle East. The United States was leading the campaign to impose international arms embargo on Iran and clandestinely broke the embargo in order to trade "arms for hostages". Although millions of dollars of TOW antitank missiles and Hawk anti-aircraft missiles and their support equipment were smuggled to Iran, the plan failed miserably and Iran received the weapons without securing the release of but three Americans. The scandalous affair stands as the only major blot in Reagan's otherwise unblemished presidency. In the 2000's Hezbollah turned into a paramilitary organization and uses missiles, rocket launchers and detonations of explosive charges instead of capturing, murders, and hijackings.

A return to Islamism in the 1980's

The failure of post-World War II independent Islamic states to achieve social and economic reforms using Western models of development created widespread disillusionment and distrust of Western ideals including "democracy". In its place, the 1970's and 1980's brought forth a desire to restore the *Shari'ah* and return to the Islamic heritage. Members of the general public conveyed this desire by the wearing of Islamic dress and embraced the belief that Islam was a divinely ordained system that Allah had commanded them to follow. They believed that in copying western institutions, they experienced defeat and corruption and that only by restoring Islam would the Islamic nations experience prosperity and harmony.

Oil Kingdoms

Oil is what makes this area the center of world attention. Wealth gained by the exportation of oil has transformed the Middle Eastern kingdoms from backward impoverished feudal states and enabled them to achieve such prominence. In attempt to gain control over fluctuating oil prices and offset the influence of foreign oil companies, representatives from five oil producing countries, Iran, Iraq, Kuwait, Saudi Arabia and Venezuela, founded the Organization of Petroleum Exporting Countries (OPEC) in 1960. (A similar group consisting of Arab countries was formed in 1968, the Organization of Arab Petroleum Exporting Countries (OAPEC)). At first OPEC had operated as an informal bargaining unit for the sale of oil by resource-rich Third World nations. OPEC confined its activities to gaining a larger share of the profits generated by the Western oil companies and greater control over the members' levels of production. Following the 1967 War, OPEC began to exercise independence and utilize the collective bargaining power of its members to pressure the Western oil companies to increase oil prices. This was not easy because of the abundance of oil (supply vs demand). Despite worldwide abundance of oil as demand increased, the Middle East came to supplying an ever increasing percentage. Saudi Arabia supplied 21.6 percent of Europe's oil in 1972 and 13 percent of the world's supply in 1973. Even the United States, the world's largest consumer of oil, received 8.1 % of its oil from Saudi Arabia. As a result of this and other events in the early 1970s, OPEC began to exert its economic and political strength; the major Western oil conglomerates, as well as the importing nations, suddenly faced a unified bloc of exporters. In the midst of the Arab-Israeli conflict of 1973, the US engaged in extensive supply of modern tactical jets and helicopters to Israel. OAPEC countries face the dilemma of supplying oil to the chief supporter of Israel while their Arab brethren were engaged in the war with Israel. Saudi Arabia's King Faysal made the fortuitous decision to participate in the Arab oil embargo. Libya announced it would embargo all oil shipments to the United States. Saudi Arabia and the other OAPEC states quickly followed suit, joining the embargo on October 20, 1973. OAPEC oil ministers agree to use oil as a weapon to influence the West's support of Israel in the Yom Kippur war. They recommend an embargo against non-complying states and mandate a cut in exports. A scramble to purchase non-Arab oil inflated oil prices as much as four-fold. Saudi revenues skyrocketed by 330%. In 1981 when oil prices peaked at 12 times pre-1973 values, Saudi Arabia's oil revenues were an astounding \$102 billion.

Judicious distribution of oil wealth became the important force behind Saudi diplomacy. Syria and PLO received generous financial support from Saudi Arabia in exchange for muting their criticism of the royal regime and its ties with the United States. Although the Saudi government preferred to buy off potential enemies rather than fight them, it viewed the Iranian revolution as a major threat to regional stability.

Yemen, Saudi Arabia's neighbor to the south, posed the greatest threat as factions within the Yemeni armed forces, inspired and supported by Nasser, attempted a coup in 1962 against the monarch Imam Muhammad al-Badr forcing him to retreat to the north. Yemen was embroiled by civil war in which South Yemen received substantial military assistance (as much as 70,000 Egyptian military personnel) from Nasser's Egypt and royalists in North Yemen were aided by the Saudi government. Egyptian aircraft on several occasions bombed Saudi border towns. King Faysal exercised restraint in retaliating and by the end of the 1967 War, Egypt agreed to withdraw its troops. That same year, Britain ended the Aden Protectorate in the South and this was immediately replaced with the Marxist government, People's Democratic Republic of South Yemen (PRDSY). The PDRSY was the most radical government in the Middle East, supported by the Soviet Union and committed to the overthrow of all traditional monarchies on the Arabian Peninsula. Saudi Arabia deftly maneuvered regional politics at times pitting Northern Yemen against the South and other times promoting reunification of the two Yemens. In the 1970's and 1980's, the Saudis beefed up their military with sophisticated weaponry from the United States. Keenly aware that young officers were the source of coups in Egypt, Iraq, Syria and Yemen, King Faysal kept the armed forces under close surveillance and appointed senior officers from among the Saudi family. In addition, to diffuse dissatisfaction of the masses, the government embarked on programs to transform the lagging infrastructure and poverty. King Faysal was assassinated in 1975 by one of his nephews. Faysal was the last monarch to exercise full royal decision-making powers; his successors (Khalid 1975-1982 and Fahd 1982-present) ruled through collective agreements reached among leading members of the royal family. As with many of the oil kingdoms, a large numbers of foreigners made up the population supplying technical experts oil workers and supporting laborers. By 1980, some 2.1 million workers resided in the country with 400,000 of their dependents. There were one million workers from North Yemen, 200,000 Palestinians, 200,000 Egyptians 50,000 Filipinos and Pakistanis, some 40,000 from the United States and 25,000 from Britain. An indirect source of revenue for their native countries, the workers provided another means of leverage the oil kingdom wielded over the neighboring Arab states. By deporting large numbers of workers, the Saudis could further influence regional politics.

Saudi Arabia is in many ways similar to Iran under the shah, both having extensive economic, educational and military development without a corresponding change in political freedom. The middle class professionals were Western-educated, brought democratic ideas back to the Arabian Peninsula but found that they were denied channels through which to express their aspirations and grievances. However, unlike the shah, the Saudi monarchs were legitimized by their defense of Islamic beliefs and values. By posing as the protector of Islam, the royal family justified its monopoly of power. Unlike Iran, the ulama were, instead of being ignored, brought into a mutually beneficial relationship by putting them on government payroll. In exchange they retained extensive influence over education, the legal system and important sphere of public activity. Although excluded from making policy, the Saudi kings made it a point to seek ulama opinions regarding policies that might affect the Islamic standing of the royal family and domestic issues. They controlled the Morality Police, an organization responsible for enforcing Islamic traditions such as the wearing of proper attire by women, the closure of shops during prayer times, etc. In the 1980s, the authority of the Morality Police was expanded to monitor foreign residents in the kingdom and propagate Islamic doctrines into the rural communities. Not all went so smoothly. The excesses of certain princes (and there were 5,000 of these by 1980) raised the public ire and called into question the piety of the royal family. During the pilgrimage in November 1979, Juhayman al-Utaybi, a former officer of the National Guard, led a conspiracy of some 500 hundred well

armed dissidents and seized the Grand Mosque of Mecca. Grabbing the PA system, Juhayman broadcast accusations of corruption and materialism against the royal family and the silent ulama. He " began advocating a return to the original ways of Islam, among other things; a repudiation of the West; an end of education of women; abolition of television and expulsion of non-Muslims." He proclaimed that "the ruling Al Saud dynasty had lost its legitimacy, because it was corrupt, ostentatious and had destroyed Saudi culture by an aggressive policy of Westernization." The standoff lasted two weeks as government forces sought approval from the ulama for the use of deadly force to break the siege (Islamic Law forbids the use of force within the walls of the Mosque) and agonized how they might protect the holiest shrine of Islam from damage. After being repulsed, government forces regrouped and tried different tactics. In the end more than 250 pilgrims, rebels and troops were dead and another 560 injured. Interestingly, the bin Laden family was involved in the catastrophe: one son, Mahrous bin Laden, was arrested and later released while the family business, which was awarded the task of renovating the Mosque in 1973, supplied trucks and crucial technical information about the Mosque to government forces. The bin Ladens have close ties with the royal family. In Iran, Ayatollah Khomeini told radio listeners, "It is not beyond guessing that this is the work of criminal American imperialism and international Zionism." Muslim anti-American demonstrations followed in the Philippines, Turkey, Bangladesh, eastern Saudi Arabia, the United Arab Emirates and Pakistan. Anger fueled by these rumors peaked within hours in Islamabad, Pakistan, and on November 21, 1979, the day following the takeover, the U.S. embassy in that city was overrun by a mob, who then burned the embassy to the ground. A week later, this anger swept to the streets of Tripoli, Libya, where a mob attacked and burned the U.S. embassy there on December 2, 1979.

Kuwait is not only one of the smallest but also one of the wealthiest nations per capita in the world. It is "low hanging fruit" in the eyes of Iran, Iraq and Saudi Arabia, who consider Kuwait a state to be annexed. In 1934, it was discovered that the tiny kingdom was situated over one of the largest oil reserves in the world. Fortunately, Kuwait was ruled by Amir Abdallah al-Salim al-Sabah, a frugal and wise monarch. After negotiating independence from Britain in 1961, Abdallah established an elected national assembly and a relatively free press. Although Kuwaitis enjoy the most intellectually and politically diverse state in the Gulf, the monarchy retains the right to dissolve and reinstate the assembly at will. This happened on two occasions from 1976 to 1981 and again from 1986 to 1992 when the assembly overstepped its bounds in challenging the ruling family. Unlike other nationals, Kuwaitis receive government benefits without any taxes. Because of the oil industry, foreign workers outnumber Kuwaitis. By 1980, 60% of the population was from foreign countries including some 300,000 to 400,000 Palestinians. In addition, Kuwait was dependent upon Japan and the West for its oil market, and for civil engineers to build its infrastructure. In the 1980s, Kuwait diversified embarking on an ambitious program of overseas investment. By mid 1980's income from investments exceeded oil revenues. By providing generous foreign aid to potential enemies including the PLO, the Arab states neighboring Israel and Iraq during the costly Iran-Iraq War, Kuwait sought to preserve its independence and keep annexing parties at bay. The plan failed when in 1990, Iraq invaded Kuwait.

Oman

Commanding the Strait of Hormuz and access to the Persian Gulf, the sparsely populated and little heard-of nation of Oman has a diverse history. Unlike the Arabs neighboring Arabian Peninsula states which are predominantly Sunnis, Omanis uniquely belong to the Ibadi Sect of Islam. Distinct from Sunnis and Shi'ites, Ibadis practice friendship and unity with other true believers, dissociation but not hostility toward unbelievers and sinners. They disapprove of the killing of Muslims because of doctrinal or political differences. They agree with Sunnis as far as the caliphate but have other doctrinal differences. In the 1970's Sultan Qabus monarchy was under constant threat from Marxist forces in the province of Dhofar. Dhofar rebels were supported by the China and the Soviet Union and South Yemen offered sanctuary for rebels fleeing government forces. Oman received considerable oil revenues and like

Kuwait, had to rely on foreign expertise and labor. Despite his increasingly educated population, Oman has no means of popular participation in government and all power is invested in the sultan. How this kingdom manages to survive is subject speculation.

Persian Gulf States

Nine political entities lining the Persian Gulf were under British control until their independence in 1971. Seven states including Abu Dhabi, Dubai, Sharja, Ajman, Umm al-Qaiwain, Fujairah, and Ras al-Khaimah federated together to form the United Arab Emirates or UAE (an *Emir* is a high-ranking sheikh or prince, emirate = principality). The other two, Bahrain and Qatar chose to remain separate kingdoms. With the British withdrawal from the region in 1971, these entities feared because their independence open doors of imperial claims of neighboring Gulf states such as Iran and Saudi Arabia. Indeed Iran claimed sovereignty over Bahrain and the shah's forces occupied three small islands in 1970. The matter was brought to debate in the UN where Bahraini leaders argued that annexation was not the popular mindset of their people and that it would unfairly end 150 years of Sheikh al-Khalifa's clan's just and benevolent rule. The matter was carried and Iran and Britain agreed to the independence of Bahrain. Bahrain was the first Gulf state to develop a petroleum-based economy in 1934 and thus had a head start over any of the other Gulf states in terms of economic development. Only 30% of the population is foreign residents compared to 80% in both Qatar and UAE. Because of this and their major customers being Western powers, these tiny monarchies have friendly relations with the West.

The Rise of Saddam Hussein and the 1991 Persian Gulf War

Iraq is a tapestry of diversity both ethnically and religiously. Fifteen percent of Iraqis are ethnic Kurds, residing in the highlands of the north. Close to 50% are Shi'ites concentrated around Najaf in southern Iraq. This is where Khomeini was exiled in the 1960's. Ten percent are Christian minorities and the remaining 40% Sunni Muslims. With an appeal for Arab nationalism, what Nasser was to Egypt in the 1960s, Saddam Hussein proclaimed himself to be for Iraq in the 1980s. A Ba'th Party member and a Sunni Iraqi, Hussein was assigned to assassinate Iraqi dictator Abd al-Karim Qassem in 1959. In an apparently botched attempt, Hussein escaped to Syria where he was warmly received by Ba'thist leaders there. The young Hussein went to Cairo to study law where he saw firsthand Nasserism in action. It made a lasting impression. When he finally returned to Iraq, Saddam quickly rose through the ranks of the Ba'th party. In 1963 when Qassem was finally overthrown and the Ba'th returned to power, Saddam was made deputy chairman of the Revolutionary Command Council (RCC) under the tutelage of the party's leader Ahmad Hassan al-Bakr. When the aging al-Bakr "retired" in 1979, Saddam emerged as the new president of Iraq, after an apparently bloodless coup. It was after this the bloodshed began. The Ba'th's ideological army, the Popular Militia, grew in size and power. Within weeks of Saddam's assumption of the presidency, the purges began. Some five hundred high ranking party members including officers within the RCC and notable Iraqi government figures were executed for "crimes against the state". Meanwhile Saddam appealed to popular sympathies by proclaiming himself protector of not just Iraqis but the whole Arab "empire". Khomeini's threats to export their Islamic revolution beyond Iran's boundaries gave him a "cause" for his regional ambitions. He compared war with Iran to that of Qadisiyya, the famous battle in 637 AD in which Muhammad's Arab followers defeated the Persians. The disputed *Shatt al-Arab* in Iran's oil rich southwest region which Iraqis called "Arabistan" was a bone of contention between Iraq and Iran. With Nasser gone, Sadat having betrayed the Arab cause by negotiating with the Zionist enemies and Qaddafi too bombastic and too remote, Saddam saw himself as the only natural standard bearer capable of restoring to the Arabs the glory they once held. Saddam saw the timing was right: Iran's revolution was young, fraught with internal squabbles and isolated from its main foreign benefactor, the United States. On September 22, 1980, Iraq invaded Iran's southwest taking the Shatt-al Arab which it held for the next year. In September 1981, the Iranians regrouped and achieved almost complete reversal of the gains Iraq achieved in the previous year and put the Iraqis on the defensive. The Iranian drive lost momentum by the following July and for the next

six years, the war became a stalemated slogging match, involving trench warfare and chemical weapons ala World War I which cost a half million lives from both sides. In 1984, the war escalated and both sides began attacking oil rigs and tankers in the Gulf. When it began involving ships from non-combatant nations including Saudi Arabia and Kuwait, the war evolved into an ominous international affair. In 1987, American and Soviet naval vessels began escorting tankers of neutral flags. A US Navy ship, the USS Stark was struck on 17 May 1987, by two Exocet antiship missiles fired from an Iraqi F-1 Mirage plane. The Iraqi fighter fired the Exocet missiles at about the time the fighter was given radio warning by the Stark. The missiles hit the ship and one exploded in crew quarters, killing 37 sailors and wounding 21. Iran attacked two Soviet Navy ships which were protecting Kuwaiti tankers. The *Seawise Giant*, the largest ship ever built in history, was damaged by an Iraqi air force Exocet missiles while transiting the Strait of Hormuz on 14 May 1988 and carrying Iranian crude oil. She sank and was declared a total loss. In 1988, while Iraqi warplanes began missions of genocide, dropping cyanide and other chemical bombs on Kurdish villages on both sides of the Iran-Iraq border, Iranian naval units began aggressive advances on US and Soviet naval units in the Gulf. US-drafted Security Council Resolution 585 was passed in the UN, calling for cease fire between Iran and Iraq and preserving freedom of safe navigation within the Gulf. Iran responded by placing mines in international waters. On 14 April 1988, the frigate USS *Samuel B. Roberts* was badly damaged by an Iranian mine, wounding 10 sailors. U.S. forces responded with Operation Praying Mantis on 18 April, the United States Navy's largest engagement of surface warships since World War II. Two Iranian oil platforms, two Iranian ships and six Iranian gunboats were destroyed. Former Prime Minister In January 1985, Bazargan criticized the war as un-Islamic and illegitimate, arguing that Khomeini should have accepted Saddam's truce offer of 1982 instead of attempting to overthrow the Baath. Khomeini was annoyed by Bazargan's telegram, and issued a lengthy public rebuttal in which he defended the war as both Islamic and just. Bazargan went on to criticize Khomeini for the war, which Bazargan stated was bankrupting Iran, and slaughtering its youth for no good purpose. By 1987, there were increasing signs that Iranian morale was breaking as reflected in the failure of several government campaigns to recruit "martyrs" for the front:

"The economy was collapsing. War and revolution had taken their toll. Only war industries survived, and the standard of living was dropping precipitously. There were no longer enough recruits for the Revolutionary Guards; the Iranian war machine was no longer capable of supplying the huge armies that had marched singing to war in the early days...The country was sliding steadily into bankruptcy. Strict Islamic law forbids usury, and Khomeini interpreted that to mean Iran could not borrow against future oil revenues to meet the expenses of war. Iran paid cash, and when the reserves were exhausted, Iran had to rely on income from its oil exports. Oil revenue dropped from \$20 billion in 1982 to \$5 billion in 1988. At an OPEC meeting in June 1988, Saudi Arabia, who had broken diplomatic relations with Iran two months earlier, vetoed a last, desperate Iranian initiative to cut production and thus raise prices again"

Khomeini seemed bent on an inexorable, suicidal fight to the death until on July 3, 1988, the US cruiser USS *Vincennes* shot down Iran Air Flight 655 with the loss of all 290 passengers and crew by mistake. The tragedy occurred in the midst of these hostile skirmishes and the crew was apparently convinced that the airliner was in fact an Iranian F-14 fighter. Nine months after the downing of Iran Air Flight 655, on March 10, 1989, Rogers' wife Sharon escaped with her life when a [pipe bomb](#) attached to her [minivan](#) exploded, while she was driving. An Iranian scholar said a turning point in Iran's thinking came with the shooting down of an Iranian passenger plane in July 1988 by the American cruiser USS *Vincennes*. That incident apparently led Ayatollah Khomeini to conclude that Iran could not risk the possibility of U.S. open combat operations against Iran and he decided it was time to end the conflict.

[As an aside, the "all-or-nothing" rules of engagement issued to *Vincennes*, and even the commitment of such a high-value ship itself, gets back to an understanding, or lack of understanding of the contextual environment of the operations. A clear understanding of the potential threat posed by Iran at the time

would clearly have indicated that the Iranian Air Force (IAF) represented one of the assets which the Tehran clerics had been unable and/or unwilling to even hint at using against US military targets. (I disagree with this last statement) Therefore, to allow no “grey” area, for human intervention into the engagement, was fatal, leading to the automatic destruction of the Iran Air “target”. It was this which subsequently led to the Iranian decision to bomb Pan Am Flight PA103 over Lockerbie, and the dramatic polarization of US-Iranian relations to the point that Iran’s clerics committed themselves fully to support for such radical Islamists as Osama bin Laden. — *Ed. International Strategic Studies Association*]

On July 18, 1988, Iran and Iraq accepted a UN-brokered cease-fire in which both sides returned to their pre-war boundaries. Besides the half million military and civilian deaths in Iran and Iraq, another 15,000 Iranian survivors later died from exposure to chemical weapons. Iran spent \$74-91 billion and Iraq \$94-112 billion during the course of the war. In addition, the war cost Iraq another \$230 billion to rebuild its infrastructure and economy and, unlike Iran, Iraq had acquired considerable debt (\$89 billion) which it owed to Soviet Union which had poured weaponry into the country, Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and UAE. Saddam had nothing to show for it and was desperate for an answer. In two years, the answer came: annex Kuwait.

The Persian Gulf War

in the early morning August 2, 1990, 100,000 Iraqi troops crossed the Kuwaiti border and in a matter of hours occupied the tiny kingdom while the emir, Sheikh Jaber al-Sabah fled to Saudi Arabia. Within a week, Iraq announced that it had formally annexed Kuwait as Iraq’s ninth province while they commenced the looting and plunder of one of the world’s richest countries. To most Iraqis, the existence of an independent Kuwait was an artificial creation of the colonial era and Kuwait really belonged to them from the get go. The subject of Saddam’s rhetoric was not Iran now but a host of international conspiracies against Iraq by the United States, Israel and their Persian Gulf allies: Saudi Arabia, Kuwait and the UAE. While Kuwait and UAE tried to avert conflict by conciliatory measures, the invasion was inevitable. Unprepared for reprisals, the Iraqis were still battle-weary from the eight-year conflict with Iran, the ease by which they took Kuwait had given them a false sense of security. An American-led coalition of some 36 countries including Great Britain and Saudi Arabia began Operation Desert Storm on January 16, 1991. By the end of one week and a mere one hundred hours of fighting, Iraqi ground forces were decimated. As a symbolic gesture and to generate Arab support, Saddam lobbed 12 Soviet-made Scud missiles at Tel Aviv on January 18th and another three on January 22nd. The PLO openly sided with Iraq and King Hussein of Jordan declared his neutrality for fear of provoking uprisings. Throughout the region, anti-American rallies popped up but the Arab League, after a contentious meeting in Cairo, voted twelve to three with two abstentions to support the coalition. The air campaign commenced against Iraq and retreating Iraqi forces. Along Highway 80, the main link between Basra and Kuwait, coalition forces were ordered “to find anything that moved and take it out.” After 40 hours of continuous bombing, burned remains of hundreds of vehicles lined the “highway of death”. Finally on February 27, 1991, Iraq accepted the terms of UN resolutions 660, 662 and 674 declaring Iraq’s annexation of Kuwait null and void. Iraq lost some 3,700 tanks, 2,400 armored vehicles, 2,600 artillery pieces and 100,000 soldiers. Iraqi combat jets were spared by a hastily-arranged evacuation to Iran. An additional 60,000 Iraqi troops surrendered. By stark contrast, American losses numbered 148 killed (35 due to friendly fire), 57 jets and helicopters shot down but not a single tank was destroyed.

Saddam Hussein unquenchable penchant for violence then turned to the ethnic minorities within Iraq. Uprisings by ethnic Kurds in the north and Shi’ite rebels in the south began within a few weeks of the cease fire. In early March 1991, with what little remained of the Iraqi forces, Saddam crushed the Shi’ite rebellion in the south. He then turned his attention to the Kurds in the north. By the end of the month, he had retaken most of the north, killing over 100,000 Kurdish rebels. He then began mass expulsions of ethnic Kurds to Iran and Turkey. The United Nations was slow in condemning the

ethnic cleansing of the Kurdish minority, but the Security Council passed Resolution 688 on April 5, 1991 condemning the repression of Iraqi people including ethnic minorities, demanded that Iraq cease repressive activities and respect the human rights of its entire population and allow for humanitarian aid in stricken areas. The Americans and British used the resolution to establish "No-Fly Zones" over the northern and southern regions of Iraq which they maintained for over ten years until Operation Iraqi Freedom commenced in 2003. Iraqi military aircraft were forbidden to fly in the NFZ or risk being shot down. During that time, coalition aircraft flew over 200,000 sorties, shot down four Iraqi combat jets, two coalition helicopters were shot down by mistake, and countless Iraqi anti-aircraft missile and artillery batteries were destroyed. The Kurds enjoyed the reassurance of safe skies as well as unmolested access to humanitarian aid during the NFZ enforcement years.

"The state that the Ba'th built in Iraq is far worse than one purely built on confessional or ethnic criteria. It is worse because it is consistently egalitarian in its hostility to everything that is not itself. The Ba'th demand from all Iraqis absolute conformity with their violence-filled, conspiratorial view of a world permanently at war with itself. Saddam Hussein invents and reinvents his enemies from the entire mass of human material that is at his disposal; he thrives on the distrust, suspicion, and conspiratorialism which his regime actively inculcates in everyone; he positively expects to breed hate and a thirst for revenge in Sunni and Shi'i alike. As a consequence civil society, attacked from every direction, has virtually collapsed in Iraq."

Changing Face of the Revolution in Iran

After the death of Khomeini and end of Iran-Iraq War, public disillusionment began to grow. In the 1990s, President Ali Akbar Rafsanjani, a moderate cleric, and Khomeini's successor as supreme Islamic jurist formed an uneasy alliance with which they sought to tone down the control of the ulama over their society. On one side, the new president and moderates sought to reorient the government policies toward the realities of a global economy, reestablish relations with neighboring Gulf states and placate the growing dissension of the popular support base. The opposing radical ulama wished to deepen the Islamization of Iran, perpetuate their control of the government and keep the prerogatives of the supreme Islamic jurist intact. The debates between the opposing parties in the Majlis was made public increasing the awareness that the government's positions need not go unchallenged and that dissent was present even within the ulama. President Rafsanjani began economic ventures with the outside world to arrest the spiraling economy and relaxed the enforcement of social behavior. The growing dissent came to bear in the 1997 presidential elections when the government candidate supported by the supreme Islamic jurist was soundly defeated by an independent candidate, Muhammad Khatami. At that time 60-70% of Iran's population was 25 years old or younger and did not share the aggressive anti-Western attitudes of the ruling ulama. They did not remember the shah and began to resent the restrictions imposed by the Morality Police and religious vigilantes. Khatami wished to have women and young people participating actively in the Islamic Republic rather than having them rebel against it as alienated outsiders. He campaigned on a platform of tolerance and social reform. Furthermore, he made overtures for restoring relations with the United States on CNN. These policies put him on a collision course with the radical ulama and the supreme Islamic jurist. Khamenei publicly denounced the United States in a sermon and denied any intention for reconciliation. In the 2000 parliamentary elections, Iranian moderates won 2/3 of the Majlis seats. The pro-reform vote was driven by young adults and women seeking economic improvement, greater freedom of speech and a reduced role of religious law in social affairs. This generated a backlash from the radical ulama. Supreme Islamic jurist Khamenei used his authority over the judiciary, the media and paramilitary organizations to crackdown on the reformist press and intellectuals, break up pro-reform student demonstrations and block the Majlis proposals to modify existing laws. Although the reformists contended that they represented a wishes of their constituents, the ulama countered by noting the constitution empowered the Council of Guardians to ensure that all laws passed by the Majlis conformed to Islamic principles. In addition, veto power rested

with the Supreme Islamic jurist, rendering impossible any reform measures that President Khatami and the Majlis wished to enact.

Despite these failures, Khatami was reelected by a popular landslide in the 2001 presidential elections. In reaction, the ulama instituted a policy of repression of even greater proportions. Arrests of political opponents, newspaper closures and vigilante killings were endorsed by the Islamic leadership. Khatami's moderate approach began to lose its appeal. Student leaders claimed the authoritarian government could not be changed from within. The self-selective circle of ulama held virtual control of the government and was not about to be changed by the moderates. Their pessimism was confirmed when after the 2004 parliamentary elections, the Council of Guardians forcefully took control of the Majlis, disqualifying some 2,000 reformist candidates whom they claimed did not support Iran's Islamic system. With the growing disillusionment, many voters did not turn out for the 2005 presidential elections. An unlikely candidate emerged as the new president. He had served as mayor of Tehran for only two years and that by appointment. A member of the **Abadgaran** (Alliance of builders of Islamic Iran) whose members were right wing conservatives affiliated with the Revolutionary Guards. The Abadgaran "seems to have been formed in 2003 and is made up broadly of figures under the age of fifty, who are non-clerics and the Alliance enjoyed a majority in the Majlis. The leading figure of the Alliance in 2005 was Mahmoud Ahmadinejad a well educated civil engineer and supported by the supreme Islamic jurist, Ali Khamenei. As mayor, he reversed changes made by previous moderate and reformist mayors. He put religious emphasis on the activities of cultural centers they had founded, publicized the separation of elevators for men and women in the municipality offices. Ahmadinejad generally sent mixed signals about his plans for his presidency, perhaps to attract both religious conservatives and the lower economic classes. His campaign slogan was: "It's possible and we can do it". Ahmadinejad was the only presidential candidate who spoke out against future relations with the United States. He told Islamic Republic of Iran Broadcasting the United Nations was "one-sided, stacked against the world of Islam." Because of the low turnout of voters, Ahmadinejad won 62 percent of the vote in the run-off poll against the more moderate and former president Akbar Hashemi Rafsanjani. Supreme Leader Ayatollah Khamenei authorized the Ahmedinejad presidency on 3 August 2005. Ahmedinejad kissed Khamenei's hand during the ceremony to show his loyalty. After his loss at the presidential elections in 2005, a growing tension between Rafsanjani and President Ahmadinejad arose. Rafsanjani has criticized Ahmadinejad's administration several times for conducting a purge of government officials, slow move towards privatization and recently hostile foreign policy in particular the atomic energy policy. In return Ahmadinejad has fought back that Rafsanjani failed to differentiate privatization with the corrupt takeover of government-owned companies and of foreign policies which led to sanctions against Iran in 1995 and 1996. He also implicitly denounced Rafsanjani and his followers by calling those who criticize his nuclear program as "traitors". Ahmadinejad's inexperienced government was unable to prevent inflation and attempts to inject funds into the failing economy seemed only to erode the oil stabilization fund which had been intended as a cushion to guard against falling oil prices in the future. Oil exports accounted for 60% of Iran's revenue which made it vulnerable to oil price fluctuations. The Iranian business circles became disillusioned with the government's economic policies. Furthermore, booming housing prices inflated rents beyond the means of most young families worsening the gap between rich and poor. Growing anger among the lower classes led to rioting in 2007 following the government's decision to ration gasoline. although Iran has vast crude oil reserves, it has limited refining capacity and must rely on imported gasoline to meet its own domestic requirements. Ahmadinejad's rhetoric and defiance with regard to international regulation of Iran's atomic energy program had gained some popularity among certain conservative groups in Iran but raised the ire of the international community and alarmed some of the neighboring Islamic regimes. Some of Ahmadinejad's words are just that, as the presidency is limited to running the administration, but the policy-forming power of the government remains within the hands of the collective leadership of the Supreme Islamic jurist and the Council of

Guardians. Moderates and more pragmatic conservatives began to feel increasingly disaffected by the president's policies, economics and rhetoric isolating Iran from the West and Persian Gulf neighbors. They began to be critical, stating that his brash words frightened away desperately needed foreign investments. For many in the middle and upper classes, the policies of the Islamic Republic were incompatible with the kind of lives they wished to lead in this new millennium. In 2006, the Ahmadinejad ^[87] government reportedly forced numerous Iranian scientists and university professors to resign or to retire. It has been referred to as "second [cultural revolution](#)".¹ according to [Human Rights Watch](#), "Respect for basic human rights in Iran, especially freedom of expression and assembly, deteriorated in 2006. The government routinely tortures and mistreats detained dissidents, including through prolonged solitary confinement." "the Ahmadinejad government, in a pronounced shift from the policy under former president Mohammed Khatami, has shown no tolerance for peaceful protests and gatherings." Ahmadinejad's government had the highest budget deficit since the Iranian revolution. ¹During Ahmadinejad's tenure as President of Iran the foreign policy of the country took a different approach from the previous administration. Relations with the West generally soured while relations with other parts of the world, including Africa and Latin America, were on the ascendance. In light of the calls for sanctions on Iran for its nuclear weapons programme, Ahmadinejad and his foreign minister, Manouchehr Mottaki, traveled extensively throughout the two regions, as well as hosted other leaders. Relations with the ALBA states, and Venezuela, Bolivia, and Ecuador, in particular, were most strengthened. Ahmadinejad is an outspoken critic of the [United States](#), [Israel](#), and [United Kingdom](#).

During the 2009 Presidential election, Rafsanjani's former rival and incumbent president, Mahmoud Ahmadinejad, won a (highly disputed) landslide victory over challenger Mir-Hossein Mousavi. After the disputed results of the election were certified by the Supreme Leader, Rafsanjani was reported to have called a meeting of the Assembly of Experts, but it is unknown what the outcome or disposition of this meeting actually was. Former presidents Khatami, and Rafsanjani, , along with opposition leader Mousavi, did not attend the ceremony. Opposition groups asked protesters on reformist websites and blogs to launch new street demonstrations on the day of the inauguration ceremony. On inauguration day, hundreds of riot police met opposition protesters outside parliament. In May 2011 Ahmadinejad announced that he would temporarily run the Oil Ministry.

911, OIF and Beyond

After the surprise attacks on the World Trade Center towers and Pentagon on September 11, 2001, the Bush administration sought to rout out al Qaeda from its Afghan bases with the global war on terrorism (GWOT) beginning with Operation Enduring Freedom (OEF). As Osama bin Laden freely claimed responsibility for the attacks, on September 20, 2001 the United States issued a five point ultimatum to the Taliban, the Islamist militia ruling Afghanistan, including:

1. Deliver to the U.S. all of the leaders of al-Qaeda
2. Release all imprisoned foreign nationals
3. Close immediately every terrorist training camp
4. Hand over every terrorist and their supporters to appropriate authorities
5. Give the United States full access to terrorist training camps for inspection

After the Taliban refused to comply on October 7, 2001, the United States unleashed simultaneous airstrikes and missile attacks on al Qaeda and Taliban military targets.

Afghanistan and the Taliban

Located at the "crossroads of the world", Afghanistan has been the site of conflict for centuries.

Of the Taliban regime, Physicians for Human Rights (PHR) say:

"To PHR's knowledge, no other regime in the world has methodically and violently forced half of its population into virtual house arrest, prohibiting them on pain of physical punishment."

—Physicians for Human Rights, 1998

According to a 55-page report by the United Nations, the Taliban, while trying to consolidate control over northern and western Afghanistan, committed systematic massacres against civilians. U.N. officials stated that there had been "15 massacres" between 1996 and 2001. They also said, that "[t]hese have been highly systematic and they all lead back to the [Taliban] Ministry of Defense or to Mullah Omar himself."^{[63][64]} The Taliban especially targeted people of Shia religious or Hazara ethnic background. Upon taking Mazar-i-Sharif in 1998, about 4,000 civilians were executed by the Taliban and many more reported tortured. The documents also reveal the role of Arab and Pakistani support troops in these killings. Bin Laden's so-called 055 Brigade was responsible for mass-killings of Afghan civilians.

Al Qaeda

Established in 1988 from the international Muslim brigade formed initially by Osama bin Laden and the Palestinian religious scholar Abdullah Azzam to counter the Soviet invasion of Afghanistan, **al Qaeda** ("the base") --recruited, trained, and financed thousands of foreign mujahadeen, or holy warriors, from more than fifty countries. Bin Laden wanted these fighters to continue the *jihad* ("holy war") beyond Afghanistan. In particular, bin Laden's chief targets were the United States, other Western European countries (especially Britain), Israel and pro-Western monarchy of Saudi Arabia. A non-government organization, al Qaeda is not associated with any country, recognizes no borders, has no established headquarters and works by means of underground operatives in hostile lands (including the United States) and ruthless domination in the harboring tribal lands. Operating from training bases in Sudan in 1980's, Al-Qaeda's management philosophy has been described as "centralization of decision and decentralization of execution." In 1991, al Qaeda moved to Pakistan and over the years has developed a more complex organization.

- The Military Committee is responsible for training operatives, acquiring weapons, and planning attacks.
- The Money/Business Committee funds the recruitment and training of operatives through the *hawala* banking system. U.S.-led efforts to eradicate the sources of terrorist financing were most successful in the year immediately following September 11; al-Qaeda continues to operate through unregulated banks, such as the 1,000 or so *hawaladars* in Pakistan, some of which can handle deals of up to \$10 million. It also provides air tickets and false passports, pays al-Qaeda members, and oversees profit-driven businesses. In the 9/11 Commission Report, *it was estimated that al-Qaeda required \$30 million-per-year to conduct its operations.*
- The Law Committee reviews Sharia law, and decides whether particular courses of action conform to the law.
- The Islamic Study/*Fatwah* Committee issues religious edicts, such as an edict in 1998 telling Muslims to kill Americans.
- In the late 1990s there was a publicly known Media Committee, which ran the now-defunct newspaper *Nashrat al Akhbar (Newscast)* and handled public relations.
- In 2005, al-Qaeda formed As-Sahab, a media production house, to supply its video and audio materials.

On December 29, 1992, al-Qaeda's first terrorist attack took place as two bombs were detonated in two hotels in Aden, Yemen. The bombings were an attempt to eliminate American soldiers on their way to

Somalia to take part in the international famine relief effort. No Americans were killed because the soldiers were staying in a different hotel altogether, and they went on to Somalia as scheduled. However little noticed, the attack was pivotal as it was the beginning of al-Qaeda's change in direction, from fighting armies to killing civilians.

It is estimated there are 20-30 senior al Qaeda members. Osama bin Laden was the most notable *emir* (commander) until his assassination by US Navy SEALs on May 1, 2011. The majority of financing for al-Qaeda in the 1990s and 2000s came from the personal wealth of Osama bin Laden which was estimated at around \$300 million. Other sources of income include the heroin trade, extortion of dominated tribes and donations from supporters. In 1996 al Qaeda moved into Afghanistan finding a safe haven under the Taliban. Some 62% of its members have a college education. Its second in command took over as emir after the death of bin Laden, was formerly a surgeon practicing in Cairo, **Ayman al-Zawahiri**. Zawahiri was involved in the conspiracy that assassinated Egyptian president Anwar Sadat in 1981. **Abu Yahya al-Libi**, a Libyan who was captured by Pakistani authorities in 2002 but managed to escape from U.S. prison in Afghanistan in 2005, has emerged as the public face of al-Qaeda and another top-level leader. Some counterterrorism experts consider him a top strategist and a theological scholar, arguing that his religious scholarship makes him one of the most effective promoters of global jihad.

With the US invasion of Afghanistan in 2001, al Qaeda fled back to Pakistan where the secret bases remain nested in the highlands where the tribal territories are beyond the reach of Pakistani government forces or the US military. Bin Laden's overall strategy against much larger enemies such as the Soviet Union and United States was to lure them into a long war of attrition in Muslim countries, attracting large numbers of jihadists who would never surrender. He believed this would lead to economic collapse of the enemy nation. Al-Qaeda manuals clearly outline this strategy. The signature of al Qaeda attacks is suicide bombings that would serve to demoralize the Western public. The group has targeted American and other Western interests as well as Jewish targets and Muslim governments it sees as corrupt or impious, above all, the Saudi monarchy with the stated goal to destroy Israel and remove all Western influence from Islam. Only with the absolute rule of the Shari'a could Islam be restored. Osama bin Laden justified the killing of civilians, including women and children, as necessary in *jihad*. Al-Qaeda-linked attacks include:

- The attempted December 2009 bombing of a Detroit-bound Northwest Airlines flight.
- An October 2007 suicide bombing that narrowly missed killing former Pakistani Prime Minister Benazir Bhutto. Two months later, another bomber succeeds in killing the former prime minister; Pakistani officials blame Baitullah Mahsud, a top Pakistani Taliban commander with close ties to al-Qaeda.
- The February 2006 attack on the Abqaiq petroleum processing facility, the largest such facility in the world, in Saudi Arabia.
- The July 2005 bombings of the London public transportation system.
- The March 2004 bomb attacks on Madrid commuter trains, which killed nearly 200 people and left more than 1,800 injured.
- The May 2003 car bomb attacks on three residential compounds in Riyadh, Saudi Arabia.
- The November 2002 car bomb attack and a failed attempt to shoot down an Israeli jetliner with shoulder-fired missiles, both in Mombasa, Kenya.
- The October 2002 attack on a French tanker off the coast of Yemen.
- Several spring 2002 bombings in Pakistan.
- The April 2002 explosion of a fuel tanker outside a synagogue in Tunisia.
- The September 11, 2001, hijacking attacks on four U.S. airplanes, two of which crashed into the World Trade Center, and a third of which crashed into the Pentagon. A fourth was foiled in its attempt to reach the US Capitol.
- The October 2000 *U.S.S. Cole* bombing.

- The August 1998 bombings of the U.S. embassies in Nairobi, Kenya, and Dar es Salaam, Tanzania.

The Insurgency War in Iraq after OIF

The real enemy is al Qaeda. It is important to rout them out of where ever they may be hiding. Al Qaeda has used to great effect the strategies of local intimidation, rallying locals against a common perceived enemy (an occupying power) thus providing recruits for the insurgency, covering the agenda with disinformation, while simultaneously asserting dominance in the regions they occupy. While locals are focused on the perceived enemy, their greater enemy is al Qaeda itself.

The Lesson of the Anbar Awakening

Al Qaeda had initially presented itself as a complimentary power but eventually became a competing and then dominant power. In the wake of the U.S.-led invasion in 2003, al Anbar tribes found themselves vying against the U.S. military and al Qaeda for control of the province. Upon arrival in the region, al Qaeda immediately began to seek sources of local revenue, as is typical of the organization.¹⁴ In al Anbar, the easiest sources of revenue were illegal activities, such as smuggling and extortion, the same activities in which the local tribes had been engaged for decades.¹⁵ To force sheikhs and tribal leaders in Iraq to cede financial or tactical control, al Qaeda mounted a violent campaign of gruesome, demonstrative intimidation: kidnappings, assassinations, torture, and grotesque murders of tribal leaders and their family members, including beheadings and public dismemberment such as the December 2005 assassination of Sheikh Nasr, head of the Abu Fahd tribe. He was abducted and murdered by al Qaeda operatives a day after meeting with U.S. ambassador Zalmay Khalilzad and other tribal leaders, who had gathered to discuss ways to reduce violence in al Anbar, which included reaching out to insurgent leaders. "Al Qaeda in Iraq Situation Report" shows how "there was a complete change of events . . . cousins of Sheikh Nasr came to the Mujahidin begging, announcing their repentance and innocense [sic], saying we're with you, we'll do whatever you want."

Although initially perceived as an occupying force bent on stealing Iraq's oil and natural resources, the U.S. military became and is now seen as a complimentary and supportive power. The perception that U.S. troops will leave Iraq in the "near" future is a key factor in the Sunni tribal leaders' willingness to cooperate. The alliances with the US and coalition forces came from two groups: the Anbar Salvation Council* led by the former governor of Ramadi, Fasal al-Gaoud* and the Awakening* led by Abd al Sittar, sheikh of the Abu Reesha tribe. When he became governor of al Anbar, al-Gaoud's position in his tribe was not initially that strong. Combined with his overt affiliation with the United States, his position was weakened even further, as most of his fellow tribesmen began to make deals with insurgent groups and al Qaeda. In 2005 he was voted out of office in the Iraqi parliamentary elections and replaced by a member of the Iraqi Islamic Party. It was later that year, after being ostracized by two failed strategic moves, that al-Gaoud first proposed an alliance between his tribal followers and U.S. forces. Al-Gaoud was instrumental in forming the Abu Mahal Desert Protectors in 2005, a tribal militia along the remote Syrian desert border in al Qa'im and an important example of an early tribal willingness to resist al Qaeda. His proposal was working but was derailed when indiscriminate U.S. forces came crashing down on al Qa'im near the Syrian border, killing and capturing insurgents, al Qaeda, and al-Gaoud's tribesmen alike. Abd al Sittar was the sheikh of a lesser tribe within the Dulaymi confederation. After the 2003 invasion, he is said to have accumulated significant amounts of money running criminal operations, and likely had some sort of working agreement with al Qaeda at the time. Al Qaeda's technique of taking over local sources of revenue, however, was directly impacting Abd al Sittar's operations. So, in late 2005, he tried to rally against al Qaeda by seeking the aid of nationalist Iraqi insurgents, probably those under the leadership

of Ibrahim al-Shamari, head of the Islamic Army of Iraq. The attempted alliance failed, however, and Abd al Sittar was isolated. In the meantime, al Qaeda had killed Abd al Sittar's father and several brothers as part of their campaign to intimidate tribal leaders and take control over their income and people. As evidence of their significance to the movement and the threat it posed, al Qaeda assassinated both men (al-Gaoud in a hotel suicide bombing on June 25, 2007, and Abd al Sittar on September 13, 2007). All assessments point to growing differences between al Qaeda's foreign-led takeover of the insurgency with its moneymaking criminal activities, such as those previously held by Abd al Sittar, and the imposition of a fundamentalist Islamist lifestyle against the more practical, secular, survivalist orientation of the Iraqi tribal sheikhs as the reasons for the split. Even Iraqi nationalist insurgent groups, such as the Islamic Army of Iraq and Hamas Iraq, have cited a lack of trust and clarity in al Qaeda's intended national agenda as reasons to withdraw their support of al Qaeda in Iraq.

To win back al Anbar, the commanding Marine general for al Anbar and the commanding Army colonel for Ramadi combined separate but complimentary efforts to woo the tribes to their side. The Army commander for Ramadi, Col. Sean MacFarland, essentially offered to "deputize" a sheikh's militia, allowing police recruits to guard their own neighborhoods, an approach previously expressly forbidden by U.S. policy. Concurrent with the new approach to providing security on the ground through alliances with local leaders, commanding Marine Brig. Gen. John Allen began courting exiled sheikhs living in Jordan, Syria, and elsewhere abroad. He spent long hours negotiating with them, convincing the sheikhs that he would be able to provide them with power and money upon their return, in addition to their own security forces. He even went so far as to escort a sheikh personally from Jordan to Fallujah, and to walk him to his door.

There are not even any street addresses in the region, so for "outsiders" to infiltrate requires help from "coyotes," men who use their local knowledge to bring strangers through unnoticed. At an April 2007 meeting of the newly formed tribal alliance, one sheikh grabbed the microphone and announced, "If it was not for the coyotes among us, no one would have been killed, kidnapped, or bombed. You know who among you brought the Yemeni with the suicide vest." In effect, the sheikh was decreeing what later events would prove true: without local support, al Qaeda operatives could not work effectively in the region. As Colonel MacFarland observes, "No matter how imperfect the tribal system appeared to us, it was capable of providing social order and control through culturally appropriate means where governmental control was weak."

The Anbar Awakening has since spread across not only regional borders, but sectarian ones as well, with Shi'ite tribal leaders in the north and south of Iraq leading similar movements against al Qaeda and even joining forces at times. The movement, however, has its own internal fractures. Even as violence is down and reconstruction is up, tensions between competing factions within the Awakening councils have arisen. Some Sunni tribal leaders in al Anbar are still suspicious of the Shi'ite-led central government and its perceived association with Iran. The central government rightly sees the increasing power and independence of al Anbar tribes as a threat to its control. Prime Minister Nouri al-Maliki of Iraq has insisted that continued funding for the militias come under state control and has formed a central committee in his government to oversee their continued arming, training, and funding, much of which comes under his control in October 2008.⁴⁷ He has also strictly limited the number of tribal militias officially converted to Iraqi security forces and reserved the right to screen their members.

Marine Col. Stacy Clardy, who commanded coalition forces in al Anbar in 2007, has said, "You can only trust people to do what is in their best interests.

The Iraqis are doing what is in their best interest... These are a practical people. But it takes trust." As the colonel suggests, newly formed alliances in the region will succeed or fail not based on political or religious affiliation, but on whether the groups' interests continue to converge on common incentives, such as political participation and economic redevelopment. The insurgents who compose the majority of the ranks of al Qaeda's foot soldiers in Iraq have not all been killed, captured, or driven underground. They are the same ones who now occupy positions in the security forces, who have once again become loyal to their tribal sheikhs. They are not gone; they are transformed. Yet, the concepts themselves are not unprecedented; successful counterinsurgencies in the twentieth century have frequently involved the use of local militias.⁵³ These efforts require trust and a willingness to place that trust on locals, as well as the confidence to empower and enable local leaders. Al Anbar tribal leaders came to U.S. forces more than once before finding a receptive audience.

The new leader of the Awakening movement, Ahmed Abu Reesha, brother of Abd al Sittar, has expressed an interest in gaining formalized representation for his group as a political party with seats in the Baghdad parliament. Ahmed Abu Reesha is indeed challenging the central government, but he is pursuing his challenge peacefully, through political participation. Having addressed what his people considered the major threat to their security* al Qaeda* they no longer feel the need to pursue armed resistance. For what better solution to violent sectarian divides can one ask than to trade bullets for ballots? Tribal sheikhs in al Anbar are the traditional holders of power in the region. They have a vested interest in maintaining a stable, workable order, within and around their territories, which serves the best interests of their people. These leaders have the capability, dedication, and credibility to guide their people into political participation with the new Iraqi government. The resulting marriage of tribal support and local knowledge combined with U.S. military power produced dramatic results almost overnight in a region previously considered lost beyond all repair.

Petraeus Leaves Army After 37 Years

August 31, 2011 Associated Press | Robert Burns and Kimberly Dozier

Gen. David Petraeus is bidding farewell to the Army that has been his life and the troops that have been his family for 37 years.

America's best-known general is taking off his uniform before starting a new chapter as the 20th director of the CIA next week, where he will keep waging war on al-Qaida and other terrorist groups, but in a far different manner.

The soldier-scholar-statesman is to be sworn in as the nation's spy chief on Sept. 6, less than a week before the 10th anniversary of the terrorist attacks that killed nearly 3,000 people in New York, Washington and Pennsylvania.

It's a sharp and unexpected career turn for the man many thought would ultimately become the top officer in the land - chairman of the Joint Chiefs of Staff - after six command assignments, including four in war zones. He is credited with turning around the Iraq war and helping pivot the still uncertain campaign in Afghanistan.

Instead, President Barack Obama asked him to take over at CIA as part of a major shuffle of top national security officials that included Leon Panetta moving from CIA director to succeed the retiring Robert Gates as defense secretary.

Close friends and colleagues of Petraeus say that when he realized the White House would not make him chairman of the Joint Chiefs, he saw the CIA as the best alternative.

"I wanted this job," he told senators at his confirmation hearing, saying he had discussed the CIA post with the Obama administration for months.

Although he could have stayed in uniform at the CIA, Petraeus, 58, chose to shed it to avoid what some might see as the militarization of intelligence.

"I have a certain profile in various parts of the world," he told the Pentagon Channel in an interview Aug. 18. "And were I to travel there in uniform, it might create some confusion, frankly, as, you know: 'Who is this guy? He's still in uniform. Is he the director of the CIA or is he actually something else?'"

Petraeus soared to public acclaim in 2007-08 with his surprising success in reversing an escalation of insurgent violence in Iraq.

At a September 2008 ceremony in Baghdad marking the end of Petraeus' 19 months in command, Gates credited him with dealing a "tremendous, if not mortal, blow" to an insurgency that two years earlier seemed beyond U.S. or Iraqi government control.

"I believe history will regard you as one of our nation's great battle captains," Gates told Petraeus. Petraeus is credited with similarly solidifying gains against the Taliban in Afghanistan, though he himself says progress is "fragile and reversible."

Some critics of his push to add troops into the conflict there say Obama's decision to draw down those troops over the coming year shows the administration is abandoning Petraeus' counterinsurgency campaign.

Petraeus' aides disagree.

"That was the whole strategy from the beginning," to withdraw U.S. troops and replace them with Afghans, said Mark Jacobson, who just left the post as deputy NATO senior civilian representative in Afghanistan.

Petraeus also is seen as one of the Army's most accomplished accumulators of personal publicity. The Iraq war made him a household name. A July 2004 Newsweek magazine cover featuring Petraeus posing in front of a Black Hawk helicopter asked, "Can this man save Iraq?"

Petraeus is sometimes mentioned as a potential Republican presidential candidate, although he has said repeatedly he has no interest in politics.

His high public profile, following what most regarded as a successful first tour in Iraq in 2003, triggered some resentment in the Pentagon during Donald H. Rumsfeld's tenure as defense secretary. For that reason some saw his next assignment, to the Combined Arms Center at Fort Leavenworth, Kan., as a put-down.

"Various folks had said I've been sent to exile at Leavenworth," a bemused Petraeus told the Pentagon Channel.

But it was during that assignment in 2005-06 that Petraeus co-authored with Marine Gen. James Mattis an updated manual on how to fight a counterinsurgency campaign. It was a major success, and not just inside the military. Within a week of publication, the manual was downloaded 1.5 million times.

Petraeus put those ideas into practice when he was sent back to Baghdad as the top U.S. commander, arriving in February 2007 at a peak of sectarian violence and a low point of U.S. public confidence in the war.

He's fond of saying that the turnaround he and his troops achieved over the next year and a half was as much about a "surge of ideas" as the surge of extra troops that President George W. Bush ordered to Iraq in January 2007.

One of those ideas was to get American troops off their big, fortified bases and into small outposts throughout Baghdad, where they worked night and day with Iraqi forces to demonstrate U.S. resolve, build hope and confidence among ordinary Iraqis and gradually reverse the tide of violence. By most accounts, it worked, and Iraq grew stable enough for the Bush administration to negotiate in late 2008 an agreement to withdraw all American troops from Iraq by the end of 2011.

On the heels of that success, Bush made Petraeus commander of U.S. Central Command, overseeing all U.S. military operations in the greater Middle East, including Afghanistan and Pakistan. And when the top U.S. commander in Afghanistan, Gen. Stanley McChrystal, was abruptly relieved of duty in June 2010 for comments in a magazine story, Obama asked Petraeus to take over in Kabul and the general quickly agreed.

Petraeus grew up in a small town about seven miles from West Point, N.Y., and in 1970 he entered the U.S. Military Academy with the nickname "Peaches" and an ambition to become a doctor. He left with a commission as a second lieutenant and a commitment to a career in the infantry.

Shortly afterward he married the West Point superintendent's daughter, Holly Knowlton. His first overseas assignment was in Italy with a parachute infantry unit. In the 1980s he earned master's and doctorate degrees from Princeton University and taught international relations at West Point.

An errant bullet almost cut short his Army career in 1991. One of his soldiers accidentally shot him in the chest during an exercise at Fort Campbell, Ky. He recovered and went on to rise through the ranks in a series of assignments that included executive assistant to the chairman of the Joint Chiefs, Gen. Hugh Shelton, plus stints in Haiti and Bosnia. In 2003, as a two-star general, he took the storied 101st Airborne Division to Iraq.

He recalls the marching order he got from the Army's chief of staff, Gen. Peter Schoomaker, before heading to his Fort Leavenworth assignment in 2005.

"Shake up the Army, Dave," the chief told him. "And we did our best."